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Finance and Innovation: The Case of Publicly Traded
Firms
Abstract
We hypothesize that established firms with innovative projects and technologies will make relatively greater use
of arm’s length financing (such as public debt and equity); whereas less innovative firms will tend to use relationship
based borrowing (such as bank borrowing). The hypothesis is developed using a simple model in which firms with
more innovative projects give greater discretion to managers by relying on arm’s length financing. When a firm has
less innovative projects that are easier for a relationship lender to evaluate, the manager is given less discretion and
bank borrowing is more prevalent. Using a large panel of US companies from 1974-2000, we find that consistent with
our predictions, firms that rely more on arm’s length financing receive a larger number of patents and these patents
are more significant in terms of influencing subsequent patents. We confirm our results by demonstrating that firms
that issue public debt for the first time and firms that issue equity through an SEO exhibit a significant increase in
innovative activity for two years after the issue. Our results are robust to conditioning on financial constraints faced
by the firm, firm size, R&D expenditure, market to book, firm maturity and the choice of a firm’s decision to go to
the public debt market. Firms producing more novel patents tend to have a higher firm value, operating performance
and abnormal stock returns for upto two years subsequent to the innovation.
Finance and Innovation: The Case of Publicly Traded
Firms
“...leading economic historians have noted that much of the U.S. economy’s productive growth is attributable to innovations by
pre-existing corporations...” William Baumol (2001)
I. Introduction
In this paper, we focus on financing and innovation activity of established publicly traded firms.
As Baumol (2001, p.34) observes, much of the innovation that contributes to economic growth is
done by such firms. However, despite their importance, the literature is virtually silent on the
relationship between financing choices and the creation of successful and significant innovations
in publicly traded firms.1 We develop a simple model and empirically test its prediction that
arm’s length financing mechanisms are associated with a greater intensity and a higher quality
of technological innovation. The importance of technological innovation for economic growth in
the US and other industrialized economies is well established by the work of Solow (1957), Romer
(1987; 1990) and others. Therefore, empirical support for our prediction would be consistent with
some financing mechanisms being more conducive to technological progress and, hence, to economic
growth.
We present a simple model of the financing of innovative investments by a firm with ongoing
projects. The model allows us to develop testable predictions about the financing pattern of firms
that are innovative but well beyond the start-up stage. In our set up the firm’s capital structure
and financing arrangements are used by the board to improve investment decisions. The underlying
concern for the board is that the firm’s manager is prone to agency problems – and is never inclined
to terminate innovative projects. In particular, we show that the financial arrangements can be
used to enhance firm value by determining whether the firm’s manager has complete discretion over
the innovative project or whether an imperfectly informed agent, such as a bank, has some control
rights as well.
Three common types of financing are considered: arm’s length financing in the form of public
debt and equity, and relationship based financing in the form of bank loans. In the choice between
debt and equity, it is optimal to use the highest debt level to reduce agency costs caused by
“free cash flow” (Jensen, 1986), while keeping debt risk-free to avoid bankruptcy, assumed to be
prohibitively costly. In the choice between bank and public debt, bank borrowing is preferred
1The relation between financing and innovation in young, start-up companies has been investigated more closely.
In particular, the evidence suggests that venture capital funding is positively related to the number of innovations.
Interestingly, Kortum and Lerner (2000) in their study of young start up firms document that only “...about 8% of
industrial innovations from 1980-1992 were done by venture capital backed small firms...”.
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when the information the bank produces is of sufficiently high quality – because the bank refuses
refinancing and terminates the project when its information is negative. The bank’s information,
we argue, is more likely to be reliable when the innovation is incremental; and less reliable for more
radical discoveries (Scherer, 1984; Rajan and Zingales, 2003).2 Hence, for novel projects, the board
prefers a capital structure that consists of equity and public debt, and that does not involve the
monitoring and information gathering costs associated with bank borrowing. We also show that,
for a given level of novelty, firms that anticipate a larger number of innovations are more likely to
pay the fixed costs associated with accessing public debt markets for the first time.
Our model demonstrates that more innovative firms will rely on arm’s length financing – both
public debt and equity – and thus give managers greater discretion over innovative projects. For
firms with less innovative projects, those that can be evaluated by banks, it is optimal for some
decisions to be made contingent on the bank’s information. We also show that the debt to equity
ratio is higher when debt financing is relationship based. Intuitively, the bank can terminate the
project when it has negative information and can capture the project’s liquidation value. As a
result, the bank is willing to provide more loans ex-ante. Thus, for more novel projects and for a
higher number of anticipated innovations, since the optimal capital structure shifts from relationship
debt to arm’s length debt, there is a reduction in the proportion of debt to equity in the capital
structure.
The model generates two testable predictions. We expect firms with predominantly arm’s length
financing to have more innovations. We also expect these firms to generate radical innovations –
those with significant influence on subsequent innovations. We test our predictions by comparing
the innovative activity of publicly traded firms that differ in their financing choices. Specifically,
our proxies for arm’s length financing are the proportion of equity and public debt in the firm’s
capital structure. We also use a dummy variable to indicate if a firm has access to public debt
markets, since access may be established in anticipation of innovative activity and future rounds of
financing. We measure a firm’s innovative activity in two ways. One is by the number of patents
the firm is granted in a year which proxies for the innovative intensity of the firm. The other
measure focuses on the novelty and importance of a firm’s patents. We infer a patent’s novelty
by a count of the times it is cited by subsequent patents because it has been argued that more
cited patents have a greater influence on technological advances (see Trajtenberg, 1990; Hall et al.,
2005). It has also been showed by Hall et al. (2005) and Harhoff et al. (1999) among others, that
highly cited patents are valuable for the firm that creates them. In particular, Hall et al. (2005)
show that a firm producing a patent with just 1 more citation above the mean of its cohort has
almost a 3% higher market to book value than the average of the cohort. Thus, to take account
2Throughout the paper we will interchangeably use drastic, radical and breakthrough to refer to novel innovations.
A successful novel technology is one that is different from current existing technologies and is more likely to influence
the development of future products – by the innovating firm as well as other firms in its industry and elsewhere (Hall
et al., 2005).
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of the significance of a firm’s innovations, we weight its patents by the number of their subsequent
citations, following the methodology outlined by Hall et al. (2001; 2005). As an alternative, we also
construct measures that identify patents as being drastic when, for a given year and technology
class, they are in the top 1 percent of most cited patents.
For our empirical analysis, we use a panel of 11, 125 US firms from 1974 to 2000 to estimate
the relationship between innovation and financing choice. The sample is constructed by combining
patent information from the NBER patent dataset (described in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001)
with financial data from Compustat and SDC databases. We test our first prediction by using a
simple count of patents that a firm creates as a dependent variable and our second prediction by
using citation weighted patents variable and other indicators of drastic patents. We control for firm
specific characteristics such as size, R&D expenditures, age, operating cash, financial constraints,
profitability, industry concentration, market to book ratio, and time, state and industry fixed effects.
The major findings are consistent with our predictions. We show that firms which choose arm’s
length financing create more citation weighted and drastic patents. The effect is economically
large and suggests that firms, which have an equity to assets ratio that is 1 standard deviation
higher than the industry mean, have almost 50% more citation weighted patents. Similarly, firms
that have public debt to assets ratio that is 1 standard deviation above the industry mean, are
associated with almost 20% more citation weighted patents. Furthermore, we find that access to
public debt markets (i.e., using an indicator for outstanding debt) is associated with 13% more
citation weighted patents as compared to firms that do not access the public debt market. We find
that similar but economically weaker results hold for the simple count of patents.
We conduct a variety of additional tests that, taken together, provide strong support for the
robustness of our findings. First, we show that our results are robust to using firm fixed effects,
indicating that the results hold even after controlling for any unobserved time-invariant firm char-
acteristics. In particular, this suggests that an increase in arm’s length financing over time is
positively associated with increase in the number and quality of innovations. Second, we find that
our results remain unchanged if we estimate our regression models separately in each of the quintiles
constructed by sorting our sample of firms by financial constraints faced by the firm (as measured
by Kaplan Zingales, 1997 index; the criterion of Korajczyk and Levy, 2003 and Whited and Wu,
2005 index). While the relation between arm’s length financing and innovation is not affected, we
find that the lack of internal cash can hinder innovation for financially constrained firms, consistent
with the evidence in Himmelberg and Peteresen (1994). We also find that our results are unaffected
when we repeat the analysis in quintiles formed on other firms characteristics – age, market to book,
sales, R&D, profitability, and internal cash. Third, we examine whether there are changes in the
innovative activity of firms following a large infusion of arm’s length financing; specifically, a first
time issue of public debt or an issue of seasoned equity. We find strong evidence of an increase in
innovative activity in a two year period following offerings of this type, suggesting that firms raise
arm’s length capital in anticipation of an increase in their innovative activity.
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Fourth, we find that our results are similar when we use an instrumental variable approach to
control for possible biases due to omitted variables related to the choice of some firms to access public
debt markets. The approach addresses the concern that firms that borrow from public debt markets
are fundamentally different – differences not being captured by our main model specification. We
find that our estimates relating type of financing to innovation are similar to those found in our
main analysis. Fifth, among the firms that don’t have public debt in our sample, we distinguish
between those that rely on a single bank and those that use multiple banks. The notion is that
a multiple bank arrangement is somewhere between the relationship based nature of loans from a
single bank and the arm’s length nature of public debt. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that
the intensity and quality of innovation in firms with multiple banking relationships is higher than in
firms that rely on a single bank, after controlling for other factors, including financial constraints.
Sixth, we examine the value of firms that own patents and citation weighted patents. Similar to
existing studies (Hall et al., 2005), we find that firms with more significant patents, measured by
the number of citations received from other patents, experience a greater increase in future firm
value (40%), operating performance (31.5%) and exhibit higher future abnormal returns (1.8%).
The increase in value is gradual, however, suggesting that the market may be slow in recognizing
the significance of an innovation. Finally, our results are robust to different model specifications
(e.g., negative binomial, Poisson, first differences), variable definitions, subperiod analysis and are
valid across a wide range of industries.
We believe that our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, the paper offers a
fairly novel approach to looking at the relationship between financing arrangements and innovation.
It develops a theoretical model and provides convincing and robust evidence of an economically
(and statistically) significant relationship between arm’s length financing and the intensity and
quality of innovation in publicly traded firms. Second, we use a more sophisticated approach to
capture financing arrangements and demonstrate that arm’s length financing through public debt
and equity, rather than only the simple choice between debt and equity, is positively related to
innovation. Third, in contrast to previous studies that relate the investment side of innovation to
firm financing, we use the NBER patent dataset to measure the number and quality of successful
innovations measured by patents and patent citations. All our results using these measures are
obtained after controlling for the investment side of innovation using R&D expenditures. Finally,
and most importantly, our findings are supportive of the view that financing institutions – in our
case, the markets for arm’s length financing – may influence development of innovative technologies
and, possibly, economic growth.
Our predictions and findings are largely consistent with the theoretical arguments advanced
in the literature. In general, these arguments suggest that, for radical innovations, the costs of
relationship based financing outweigh its benefits. For instance, Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue
that in relationship financing, the lender may not have the necessary skills to properly evaluate
investments in an innovative technology. Therefore, since relationship lenders closely monitor
4
investment decisions, their presence is likely to discourage such investments. Similarly, Allen and
Gale (1999) argue that when there are differences of opinion among investors, projects are more
likely to be financed using arm’s length financing. Such differences of opinion are more probable
for innovative technologies. Our paper is also related to the existing literature on the relationship
between finance and economic growth (Rajan and Zingales, 1998a; Beck and Levine, 2002) since it
indicates that institutions supporting arm’s length financing may facilitate the innovation process
and, hence, economic growth.3 Since the paper focuses on association between specific financing
arrangements and innovative activity, the paper closest to ours may be Kortum and Lerner (2000)
which finds that firms that receive venture capital financing innovate more.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the model and develops the hypothesis
and testable predictions. Section III describes the empirical methodology, the variables used in the
empirical analysis and provides a description of the data sources and the construction of the sample.
Section IV presents the empirical results that establish an association between innovation and the
choice of financing arrangements. Section V presents further tests and section VI concludes.
II. Model and Hypothesis Development
We develop a simple model of financing of an innovative project by an established firm with existing
investments and cash flows. The model allows us to develop testable predictions about the financing
pattern of firms that are innovative but are well beyond the start up stage. In particular, the model
suggests that firms that are more innovative will give their managers greater discretion by relying
predominantly on arm’s length financing – equity and public debt. For firms with less innovative
projects, those that are more easily evaluated by banks, it is optimal for some decisions to be made
contingent on the bank’s information. We start by describing the agents, project and the contract
possibilities.
II.A. Model Set-Up
We consider a publicly traded firm with on-going investments and the potential for developing
innovative products. The firm’s board of directors, denoted by (B), is independent of managerial
influence and seeks to maximize shareholder wealth.4 The board may, for instance, insist on cer-
tain capital structure and financing choices if it believes them to be value enhancing. However,
3King and Levine (1993) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) analyze differences in economic growth across
countries and document a positive influence of financial development on economic growth. In general, cross-country
studies provide evidence that institutions exert a profound influence on economic development (e.g., see survey by
Djankov et al., 2003).
4The board members may, for instance, be motivated to act in shareholder interest out of concern for their
reputation or shareholder lawsuits. While we have modelled the board as pushing for an optimal capital structure,
there may be other players, such as large shareholders, that may potentially exercise similar influence.
5
the manager, denoted by (M), is less devoted to shareholder value than B and tends to consume
perquisites and divert firm resources. For decisions that are observable by the board, such as the
choice of capital structure, we assume that the manager is obliged to follow the board’s recom-
mendations. For unobservable decisions, such as the consumption of private benefits, the manager
follows her own interests. The manager is initially wealth constrained and, in the model’s set-up,
is not easily incentivized to act in shareholder interest. We show, however, that by its choice of
capital structure and financing decisions, B can improve investment decisions about the innovative
project and, thereby, enhance firm value.
All agents are risk neutral and the risk free interest rate is 0. There are three relevant dates:
0, 1 and 2. The firm has existing investments that are expected to produce a non-stochastic
cash-flow of Y2 at date 2. The firm receives a new opportunity to develop an innovative project
that requires an investment of I0 at t = 0. Market participants are fully aware of the firm’s new
opportunity and, at t = 0, have the same information about the project as the firm’s board and
manager. The development effort, which requires involvement of the existing manager, is expected
to be successful with probability µ. If successful, the innovation is worth v at date 2, where v is
drawn from a distribution with support [vl, vh], with vh > vl. We denote the expected value of the
innovation, if successful, as v̄. If unsuccessful, the payoff at date 2 is 0. Ex-ante, at t = 0, the
innovation project is assumed to have a positive NPV, i.e., µv̄ > I0.
At the intermediate date, t = 1, costly new information about the project’s likelihood of success
may be acquired by some agents, as we describe below. If the new information causes the project
to be terminated early i.e., at t = 1, the project’s depreciated assets can be liquidated for a value
of 0 < βv̄ < I0, where β may depend on characteristics of the project. By date t = 2, the assets
are assumed to be fully depreciated.
For expositional ease, the firm is assumed to have no internal funds at t = 0 and is forced to
access external capital markets to fund the new investment. In the analysis, we focus on three
financing sources commonly used by established, publicly traded US firms: public equity, public
debt and bank debt. The first two financing arrangements are usually regarded as being arm’s
length, while bank financing is considered to be more relationship based. The investors in public
markets (both debt and equity) are taken to be relatively small and to have no particular skill
or economic stake to bear the costs of privately acquiring the new information available at t = 1.
Hence, in our set-up, only a bank is regarded as having the skills, familiarity with the client and
economic stake to potentially develop new information at the intermediate date.
In terms of transaction costs, we abstract away from taxes and underwriting costs in the model.
If the bank decides to collect information at t = 1, it pays a cost denoted by c. Such a cost would
be anticipated and reflected in the cost of bank borrowing borne by the firm. The other transaction
cost that plays an important role in our discussion is bankruptcy cost. For simplicity, bankruptcy
costs are assumed to be large, both in terms of damaging firm value and in terms of personal
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costs such as a loss of reputation suffered by the board and management. As a consequence, we
make the simplifying assumption, that it is always efficient for the firm to have only risk-free debt
outstanding. The introduction of risky debt, while complicating the analysis, should not affect our
main results as we briefly discuss later in the section (footnote 11). We assume that the legal system
ensures that the debt contracts are strictly enforced and a default results in an immediate loss of
the manager’s control over the firm’s assets including cash flows. This loss of control assumption
is similar to the one made in the property rights literature (e.g., Hart and Moore, 1995). As a
consequence, it is never optimal for the manager to default (and to trigger a loss of control), while
there are firm assets that can be paid out.
II.B. Financial Structure Trade-offs: Equity, Public Debt and Bank Loans
Financial structure matters in the model because it can improve decision making regarding the
innovative project – since the firm’s manager may not seek to maximize shareholder value. As we
will elaborate, the capital structure choice can be used to accomplish one of two outcomes: one is
to leave the project decision making entirely to the firm’s manager, while the other is to rely on a
third party such as a bank to collect information and influence project decisions. We now provide
details about the manager’s agency problem, the information structure and the costs and benefits
of the financial choices.
II.B.1. Information Acquisition at t = 1
At the intermediate date t = 1, while the firm’s manager and the intermediary can obtain new
information about the project, the board has no independent access to the new information. Our
results suggest, however, that B may be able to induce its desired outcome i.e., whether to proceed
or terminate the project at date 1, by choosing a capital structure that elicits appropriate actions
by a bank that has collected the new information.
At this stage, it is worth pointing out that the role of banks in acquiring client information is
in the spirit of a wealth of research in the banking literature. It is claimed in the literature that a
central function, if not the very raison d’aitre, of banks is their ability to monitor clients and develop
information about their operations and quality (see e.g., Diamond, 1984; Rajan, 1992). Banks are
regarded as having certain advantages in collecting information: For instance, in the process of
making loans banks acquire information, which can lower the cost of making additional loans or
collecting new information.5 Aside from skills developed in certain types of loans or industries,
5As has been discussed in the literature, the benefit of relationship financing lies in its ability to solve asymmetric
information problems (e.g., see Diamond, 1984) and, therefore, to finance profitable projects that would not be
financed otherwise. The downside, of course, is that firms may fear a hold-up problem with the relationship financiers
(Rajan, 1992) – i.e., these lenders may exploit their unique informational advantage and extract rents from the firm
after a successful project. Such hold-up would ex-ante lead to reduced incentives to invest time, effort and human
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banks are strongly motivated to engage in monitoring and information collection when they have
substantial exposure to particular clients, especially since bank loans are usually illiquid. Clients
may also be willing to provide banks with access to information they would not disclose publicly
for competitive and other reasons (Bhattacharya and Chiesa, 1995). Hence, the incentives, skills
and access of banks to monitor and acquire new information are likely to be much stronger than
those of small investors in public equity or debt markets.
Information acquisition by the bank at t = 1 takes the following form: For a cost of c, the bank
receives a noisy signal s of the project’s success. Specifically, at t = 1, for a project that if continued
would be successful at t = 2, the bank receives a positive signal (s+) with a probability φ < 1 i.e.,
Pr(s = s+ | successful project) = φ. The rest of the time the bank receives a negative signal (s−).6
The parameter φ can be interpreted as a measure of the bank’s information precision for identifying
good projects. Note that with the positive signal the bank expects a minimum payoff of vl from
continuing the project.
The ability of a bank to uncover information about the project’s success is, however, likely to
depend on its familiarity with the innovative project’s technology and its potential for generating
value. We assume that the quality of the signal (φ) is based on how novel the innovative project
is, with the noise-to-signal ratio increasing in the novelty of the project. The notion is that banks
are able to obtain more reliable information when the projects are somewhat similar to those they
have evaluated before and have expertise in. On the other hand, a fundamentally new technology
or discovery, by definition, is not within their area of expertise and, thereby, generates a less
precise signal. Our assumption is consistent with the evidence provided in Scherer (1984, p.72)
who summarizes the findings of a survey of innovative firms on their experience with bank loans:
“...banks did not understand the nature of the technology involved in the product that was new to
them.”.7 In our analysis, we characterize project ‘novelty’ by a continuous measure n ∈ [0, 1] and
the effect of novelty on the quality of bank’s information by φ ′(n) < 0. Novelty may have other
effects as well and another assumption we make is that the liquidation values for more novel projects
are lower, i.e., β ′(n) < 0, because there may be little demand for assets associated with a more
radical, but potentially unsuccessful (given the liquidation) investment. This notion of novelty
is consistent with ‘product uniqueness’ noted in Titman and Wessels (1988). More generally, a
successful novel technology is one that is different from current existing technologies and is more
likely to influence the development of future products – by the innovating firm as well as other
firms in its industry and elsewhere (Hall et al., 2005). Hence a natural way of identifying novel
innovations in our empirical analysis is to examine the influence of an innovation on subsequent
capital into developing novel projects.
6Hence, while a positive signal implies a successful project, a negative signal can arise when the project is unsuc-
cessful or when the bank is unable to evaluate a successful project.
7There are notable exceptions, such as the Silicon Valley Bank, which specializes in financing innovative firms.
However, its focus and expertise makes it more like a venture capitalist than like a bank.
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innovations.
II.B.2. The Manager’s Agency Problem and Debt Financing
The manager’s agency problem in our model has the flavor of the ‘free cash-flow’ problem (Jensen,
1986). Specifically, we assume that at the terminal date t = 2, the final cashflows and costs are
difficult to verify. This allows M to divert for her own perquisite consumption or other personal
uses a fraction θ > 0 of any free cash flows at t = 2. The manager, therefore, will always want
to continue any ongoing project that has the possibility of producing free cash flow at date 2. As
Jensen (1986) argues, the agency problem can be potentially controlled by the use of debt – which
is also the case in our model.
As we have mentioned, the manager has no incentives to default per se in our setting; since it
only results in a loss of control over the firm’s assets including any cash flows. As long as the debt
is risk free, higher debt levels lead to lower levels of free cash flow from which the manager can
divert funds. Hence, if the total cash-flow generated by the firm at date t = 2 is Y2 + ṽ, the amount
that is available for investors (after diversion by the manager) is only (1− θ)(Y2 + ṽ). If the firm
has a level of debt D < Y2 + ṽ, then total amount that creditors and shareholders can expect to
receive is:
D + (1− θ)(Y2 + ṽ −D) = θD + (1− θ)(Y2 + ṽ).
In other words, since the manager is forced to fully pay debt-holders, this reduces the available
resources that she can divert for her own purposes. Hence, in terms of a debt strategy, it is optimal
for B to maximize the use of debt, subject to the debt being risk-free.
We can now summarize the trade-offs involved in using the three sources of financing: Equity
allows for managerial discretion, does not cause liquidation of projects that are headed for success
and does not lead to bankruptcy. The downside is that equity fails to shut down unprofitable
projects and cannot deal with agency problems. Public debt limits the free cash problem and does
not cause good projects to be liquidated. However, since no information is collected at t = 1, it
does not stop bad projects. Moreover, it can lead to bankruptcy. Finally, bank debt limits the free
cash flow problems, can cause bad projects to be liquidated, but can also result in good projects
being terminated as well. Bank debt is associated with an additional cost of c to acquire new
information and it can lead to bankruptcy.
II.C. The Choice between Arm’s Length and Relationship Financing
We determine the conditions under which shareholders benefit from letting a bank’s information
determine whether the project is terminated or continued at date t = 1. We discuss later (in
connection with Proposition 2) the details of the financing arrangement that makes it incentive
compatible for the bank to force project liquidation at date t = 1, when it receives a negative
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signal. For now we will ignore θ, the cash flow diverted by the manager. If the bank’s information
is not to be used then, from earlier discussion, the project is never terminated and the expected
payoff from the project at t = 0 is:
µv̄ (E-1)
On the other hand, if the bank is the lender, the expected payoff at t = 0 can be expressed as:
φ(n)µv̄ + β(n)(1− φ(n)µ)v̄ − c , where n ∈ [0, 1] (E-2)
The first term in the expression above is the probability of a positive signal times the expected
payoff from a successful project. The second term is the probability of a negative signal times
the payoff from early liquidation. The last term is the cost of acquiring information. Hence, it is
optimal for the decision to be made by the bank when expression (E-1)≤(E-2). Simplifying, this
condition can be expressed as:
c
v̄
≤ φ(n)µ(1− β(n)) + β(n)− µ (E-3)
To ensure that there are some conditions under which it is optimal for the bank to affect the
outcome at date t = 1, a sufficient condition is that cv̄ < 1 − µ. We will assume this in the
subsequent analysis. We can now state our first proposition:




≤ φ(n)µ(1− β(n)) + β(n)− µ
Furthermore,
(a) For a project with novelty n, there always exists a recovery rate from project liquidation, β∗,
and a level of bank information quality, φ∗, such that when φ ≥ φ∗ and β ≥ β∗, it is optimal
to give control to the bank.
(b) The more novel the project (i.e., higher n), the less likely it is that the bank will be given
control.
Proof: See Appendix D.
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. It is optimal to give the decision rights to
the bank (i.e., RHS of (E-3) is increasing) when the quality of the bank’s information is better
(φ(n) is larger) and there are greater benefits from early liquidation (β is larger). Furthermore,
since the precision of bank’s information and the liquidation value of the project is falling in project
novelty (n is larger), the likelihood that the bank will be given control of the project is falling in n
(i.e., RHS of (E-3) is falling).
10
In our analysis we have abstracted from the costs of accessing public debt markets. As an
extension, we now consider the fact that the initial issue of public debt may have a significant fixed
cost as a firm’s bonds are evaluated for the first time by rating agencies, underwriters and investors.8
We argue that in the presence of fixed costs, firms that seek access to public debt markets will tend
to be those that expect to issue bonds in the future as well. To illustrate the issue, let us modify
the model to include a one time fixed cost of issuing public debt, say, F . Consider a firm which
anticipates having to raise debt financing a number of times, say m, in the foreseeable future to
finance innovative investments over time. In other words, consider a more dynamic version of the
current one period model in which financing decisions are repeated a multiple number of times.9
A firm without current access to the public debt market will, therefore, choose between issuing





(m) < 0) represents the average fixed cost of entering the public debt market, i.e.,
the fixed cost allocated over the amount of capital anticipated to be raised in the future offerings.
This suggests that if we keep the novelty (n) of projects fixed, a higher number of anticipated
innovations can have an independent effect on making the use of public debt financing more likely.
We state this as a corollary.
Corollary 1 For a given level of novelty (n), the greater the anticipated number of innovations in
the future, the less likely it is that the bank will be given control.
To summarize, based on Proposition 1 and Corollary 1, we would expect firms to access the
public debt market when they anticipate both a larger number of innovations and more novel
innovations. Since gaining access to the public debt may be a precursor for later rounds of debt
financing, in our empirical analysis, we will consider the access to public debt financing as one of
our measures of arm’s length financing.
With regard to the capital structure choice by the board, we note that if it is optimal for the
bank to be given the decision rights over the project, then the bank debt must be of short term
(1-period) maturity. The reason is that the bank can exercise control only when the firm has an
obligation to repay its debt at t = 1 and the bank decides whether or not to refinance the debt. As
mentioned, if it is not optimal to use the bank’s information, public debt, which does not involve
the investigation costs c, will be preferred by the board. Note that in our setup we can allow for
the use of both public debt and bank debt in certain cases, though this is never an advantage and
may be a disadvantage (if, for instance, the bank engages in costly information acquisition that is
not utilized). Hence, for simplicity we will assume that the debt that is used is either all bank or
all public debt. We now discuss how the firm’s capital structure will be chosen by the board in
order to maximize firm value.
8For instance, James and Smith (2000) suggest that with the high fixed floatation cost of public debt, a minimum
economic size of a debt offering is close to $ 100 mill.
9With free cash flow problem, the board will want the firm to raise capital when the investments are made rather
than making a huge offering and carrying excess cash.
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II.D. Optimal Capital Structure Decision at t=0
Based on our discussion above and taking note of the manager’s diversion (θ fraction of the cash
flow), we characterize the board’s optimal capital structure decision at t = 0 as follows:
Proposition 2 The board optimally chooses the following capital structure for the innovative firm
at t = 0:
(a) If it is optimal for the bank to be given control over the project termination (i.e., (E-3) is
true), then it is optimal for the face value of the firm’s first period loan to be L1 = β(n)v̄+Y2,
which is the largest risk-free debt obligation the firm can assume. The rest of the capital
structure is equity and has a value (1− θ)µv̄φ(n) .
(b) If it is optimal not to give decision rights to the bank, then the capital structure consists of
public debt P2 maturing at t = 2, where P2 = Y2. The equity has a value of (1− θ)µv̄.
Proof: See Appendix D.
The intuition behind this proposition is simple. In the first statement, the largest risk obligation
(face value) that the firm can take at date 1 is L1. This consists of the two parts Y2 and βv̄. The
amount Y2 is the non-stochastic cash-flow at date t = 2 and its presence always allows the firm
to borrow an amount Y2. The other part βv̄ represents the amount obtained by liquidating the
project’s assets. The liquidation is forced only when it is incentive compatible for the bank to
not refinance L1 after receiving a negative signal s−.10 With the negative signal, the maximum
1-period loan that the bank would provide at t = 1 is Y2, thereby causing liquidation of the ongoing
project (since the firm must liquidate the project to avoid default). On the other hand, when the
bank receives a positive signal, the 1-period risk free loan it is willing to provide at t = 1 is greater
than the firm’s existing obligation L1 and the liquidation of the project. The rest of the firm’s
capital structure consists of equity. The second statement (b) implies that when it is not optimal
to give decision rights to the bank, public debt is chosen to reduce any discretionary cash with the
manager. The debt is set to the maximal amount of cash expected (for certain) at t = 0 (Y2) and
the rest of the capital structure is again equity.11
10As we have observed earlier, the firm is unable to raise alternative funds if it is denied refinancing by the bank
– this can be either because the information is negative or because the board will want project liquidation and not
allow recourse to other forms of financing. Note that if the bank’s information is not sufficiently reliable, the capital
structure is designed so it does not give control to the bank in our setup.
11For simplicity of exposition and analysis, we have assumed that the bankruptcy costs are sufficiently severe to
deter the use of risky debt. The possibility of risky debt should not, however, affect our results. In the case of public
debt: If it is optimal for the public debt to be risky, the only effect will be to increase its face value. None of the
conclusions regarding the change of control are affected. In the case of bank debt: There is no effect on the control
decisions as well. Risky debt will be issued by the bank only if the debt is issued on receipt of s− at date 1. This
implies that the total funding that the bank is willing to provide in a negative state increases from Y2 +βv̄ to Y2 +βv̄
plus an additional amount that the bank finds optimal to lend (traded off at the margin with bankruptcy costs).
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Finally, based on Proposition 1 and 2 and Corollary 1, we can analyze how the proportion of
equity to debt of the firm varies with the novelty of the innovative project at t = 0. We summarize
this in the next proposition:
Proposition 3 The more novel the innovative project (higher the n) or the greater the anticipated
number of innovations in the future, the higher the equity to debt ratio (EquityDebt ) in the optimal
capital structure of the firm.
Proof: See Appendix D.
The first part of this proposition combines the insights from Propositions 1 and 2. In partic-
ular, from Proposition 1, it follows that for a less novel project, the bank is likely to get control.
Furthermore, from Proposition 2, it is clear that with bank financing the amount of debt (L1) that
can be taken at t = 0 is higher than the amount of public debt (P2) at t = 0; since the bank takes
into account the potential liquidation value of the project at t = 1. Moreover, the equity value at
t = 0 with bank control is lower than when the firm borrows from the public debt market since
with a probability (1−φµ) the bank liquidates the firm when it gets a negative signal. Thus, for a
given n, bank control leads to a smaller equity to debt ratio. As projects become more novel, the
optimal capital structure shifts from bank debt to public debt, thereby increasing the proportion
of equity to debt. Combining the intuition above with Corollary 1, it follows that with fixed costs
of entering the public debt market, a greater number of anticipated innovations is more likely to
be associated with public debt financing – and hence a higher equity to debt ratio.
As mentioned before, in our setup there is no advantage to having a mixture of bank and public
debt and the debt is assumed to be either all bank debt or all public debt. However, over time,
as a firm gets both novel and incremental innovative projects, we expect a firm with more novel
innovations to borrow predominantly from the public debt market (Proposition 1) – and thereby
to have a high proportion of public debt in its capital structure. Thus, in our empirical analysis,
we will use the proportion of public debt financing in addition to proportion of equity (Proposition
3) and the access to public debt markets (Corollary 1) as a measure of arm’s length financing.
II.E. Hypothesis and Empirical Predictions
We conclude the section by outlining our main hypothesis and empirical predictions. Drawing upon
the model presented above, our main hypothesis is that innovative firms will have a predominantly
arm’s length capital structure. To test this hypothesis, we need measures of a firm’s innovative
activity. As we detail in the next section (Section III), we will rely on patent data to obtain
information on innovations. We do this in two ways. First, following Corollary 1, we simply count
the number of innovations a company has created as a proxy of the firm’s current and future
innovative intensity. Based on this, our first empirical prediction is:
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Prediction 1: Ceteris paribus, firms with relatively more arm’s length financing such as equity
and public debt in their capital structure will have more innovations.
Second, although a simple innovation count captures to an extent the innovative activity of
a firm, the count is likely to contain both incremental and drastic innovations. As discussed in
the model section (Proposition 1), we expect the association between arm’s length financing and
innovation to be stronger for firms with more novel or drastic innovations. To measure novelty,
we rely on the extent to which a patent has been cited by subsequent patents. Based on this, our
second empirical prediction is:
Prediction 2: Ceteris paribus, firms with relatively more arm’s length financing in their capital
structure will have more novel innovations.
Our main predictions are generally consistent with arguments made elsewhere in the literature.
Aghion and Tirole (1997), for example, argue that if the principal (in our case the relationship fi-
nancier) doesn’t have much knowledge about the firm’s projects, it is optimal to give more authority
to the agent (in our case the manager of the firm) to encourage her initiative.12 On a different note,
Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that arm’s length financing is more likely to be associated with
drastic innovation since public markets, with more publicly available information, give firms that
experiment with new technologies a better chance of obtaining financing from outside investors. In
a similar spirit Allen and Gale (1999) show that for novel projects, investors often differ in their
opinion about the likelihood of success. A relationship based financier shuts down a project if he
disagrees with the manager. Thus, the probability of approval is low since the firm’s innovative
idea has only one shot at being approved. In contrast, with arm’s length financing, there are a
large number of investors, each with her own prior about the project’s success. Therefore, the
probability that the project is approved is higher than in relationship financing since it is related
to the probability that at least one or more investor agrees to finance it.
From a different perspective, Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) reach a similar conclusion. They
argue that relationship financiers provide the firms with “soft budget constraints” because they
cannot commit ex-ante not to refinance unprofitable projects ex-post. That makes such financiers
inherently conservative ex-ante, particularly for projects that they cannot evaluate. Another draw-
back of bank financing, especially valid for our sample of US firms, is that banks might be forced
to terminate projects early due to the legal prudential reserve requirements (Stulz, 2001). Our
predictions are also consistent with the literature on capital structure, which finds that firms with
higher R&D expenditures choose less debt and more equity financing (e.g., Titman and Wessels,
1988).
12In their model, unlike ours, the beneficial role of arm’s length financing is through inducement of more effort on
part of the manager.
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III. Data, Variable Construction and Model Specification
In subsection A we describe the data sources and variables (dependent and explanatory) used in our
empirical analysis and in subsection B we discuss the model specification. Appendix A provides
detailed definition of all the variables used in our analysis. We start by describing the data sources
used to construct the dependent variable.
III.A. Data and Variable Construction
Dependent Variable
The variables that measure innovation are constructed by using data from the NBER patent
data set created by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001). The patent data set provides among other
items, annual information on patent assignee names, on the number of patents, on the number of
citations received by each patent, on the technology class of the patent and on the year that the
patent application was filed. The application year is important because it is closer to the time of
the actual innovation than the grant year (Griliches, Pakes, and Hall, 1987). Note that although
we use the application year as the relevant year for our analysis, the patents appear in the database
only after they are granted.
Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) match the assignees of the patents in the NBER dataset, by
name, to approximately 6000 manufacturing firms from Compustat, as of 1989.13 As they indicate,
the match is not perfect because assignees obtain patents under a variety of names and the USPTO
(US Patent and Trademark Office) does not keep a unique identifier for each patenting organization
from year to year. Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg perform a cumbersome procedure to account for
these idiosyncrasies and the matched firms in the patent dataset are identified by the six-digit cusip
number if the assignee is a public corporation or is a subsidiary of a public corporation covered
in the Compustat Industrial Annual database. Using these cusip numbers, we merge the financial
data in Compustat with the NBER patent dataset.
For our analysis, we augment the sample of firms with patents by including all the firms in
Compustat which operate in the same 4-digit SIC industries as the firms in the patent database,
but don’t have patents. We take the patent count to be zero for these firms. Including these
firms alleviates some of the sample selection concerns since our sampling procedure is independent
of whether the firms patent or not. We include only manufacturing firms because the matching
between the patent dataset and Compustat by Hall et al. (2001) is done only for manufacturing
firms. In addition, non-manufacturing firms usually operate under different regulatory rules and
their financing arrangements are unlike those of manufacturing firms (e.g., financial firms such as
13The fact that the matching occurs for firms that existed on or before 1989 might introduce a survivorship bias;
with older firms dominating the latter half of our sample. As discussed in our empirical section, we control for this
bias in a variety of ways and conclude that it does not affect our results.
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banks have legal reserve requirements and their financing arrangements include deposits).14 We
start from 1974 since we have information on patent forward citations, a key variable in our analysis,
from that date onward. Though our data ends in 2002, we restrict our tests to 1974-2000 since
the truncation bias in patents granted and citations received by a patent (discussed below and in
Appendix B) is especially severe in the last three years of the patent sample (Hall et al., 2005).
As Griliches (1990) indicates, patents have been widely used in the empirical literature to
measure innovation. Although patents provide an imperfect measure of innovation, there is no
other widely accepted method which can be applied to capture technological advances by individual
firms. Nevertheless, we are aware that using patents has its drawbacks. Not all firms and industries
patent their innovations, because some inventions do not meet the patentability criteria and because
the inventor might rely on secrecy or other means to protect its innovation. In addition, patents
measure only successful innovations. To that extent, our results are subject to the same criticisms
as previous studies that use patents to measure innovation (e.g., Griliches, 1990; Cockburn and
Henderson, 1998).
We use two broad metrics to measure how innovative a firm is. The first is a simple patent
count for each firm per year and measures the firm’s current and future innovative intensity. The
second metric measures the importance and drastic nature of each patent by weighing the patent
by the number of citations it receives in subsequent years. For the simple patent count we create
two variables. The first variable, Patent, counts the number of patents for each firm in the same
application year, while the second variable, Patentc is the same as the first but is adjusted to correct
for the truncation bias in patent grants (explained in Appendix B).
Our second metric of innovative activity is motivated by the recognition that a simple count of
patents to measure the level of innovative activity has its limitations. One of the biggest problems
is that it does not distinguish breakthrough innovations from less significant or incremental tech-
nological discoveries. Pakes and Shankerman (1984) and Griliches, Pakes, and Hall (1987) show
that the distribution of the importance of patents is extremely skewed, i.e., most of the value is
concentrated in a small number of patents. Trajtenberg (1990), Albert et al. (1991), and Hall
et al. (2005) among others have demonstrated that patent citations are a good measure of the
value of innovations.15 Intuitively, the rationale behind using patent citations to identify impor-
tant innovations is that if firms are willing to further invest in a project that is building upon
a previous patent, it implies that the cited patent is influential and economically significant. In
addition, patent citations tend to arrive over time, suggesting that the importance of a patent may
be revealed over a period of time and may be difficult to evaluate by financiers at the time it is
14Specifically, we exclude financial firms (SIC codes starting with 6 ) and government firms (SIC codes starting
with 9 ).
15Additionally, Harhoff et al. (1999), in a study of German patent holders of US patents, find that the most highly
cited patents are very valuable, with a single citation worth about $1 million. We provide additional evidence of the
link between citations and firm value later in the paper.
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discovered. Therefore, we use patent citations to account for the significance of innovations and
to test our prediction that firms with arm’s length financing have more novel and technologically
influential innovations.
Patent citations, however, suffer from a severe truncation bias, which arises because patent
citations are received many years after the patent was applied for and granted. Another potential
concern is that different industries might have different propensities to cite patents.16 We correct
for these biases by using two methods suggested by Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) – the “fixed
effects” method and the “quasi-structural” method. While the fixed effects method corrects for
these biases by dividing the number of patent citations by the average amount of patent citations
in the same group (year, technology class or year-technology class) to which the patent belongs, the
quasi-structural method corrects for these biases by weighting the patents by an econometrically
estimated distribution of the citation lag. Details on the two methods and their advantages and
drawbacks are explained in Appendix B. We construct three dependent variables that measure the
number of citations per patent for each firm in every year. The variable CitedPatentTime corrects for
year fixed-effects, CitedPatentTime−Tech corrects both for time and technology class fixed effects17,
and CitedPatentQuasi uses the “quasi-structural” method to correct for the truncation bias.
In another attempt to measure important or drastic innovations we use the procedure suggested
by Ahuja and Lampert (2001) to construct a variable (Drastic) by ranking all the patents in the same
application year by the number of times they are cited in all subsequent years in our sample period.
Thus, we ensure that each patent is compared only to its cohort, since patent citation data suffers
from the truncation bias explained above. Based on this ranking, we select the top 1% of patents in
each year and label them drastic innovations. Finally, we count the number of drastic patents per
firm per year. This count represents the variable Drastic. For robustness we rank the patents in the
same technological class and in the same year by the number of all subsequent citations received.
We name this variable DrasticTech. While for the variable Drastic the relevant cohort is the same
year, for the variable DrasticTech, the relevant cohort is the same year and technological class. For
robustness we also use 2% and 5% cutoff rates to identify the drastic innovations. In contrast to
Drastic, which is a count variable, CitedPatentsT ime, CitedPatentTime−Tech and CitedPatentQuasi
are continuous variables. More importantly, since both citation weighted patents and drastic patents
account for both the significance as well as the number of patents, we expect a stronger association
between arm’s length financing and innovations when innovations are measured by these variables
16For example, the computer industry tends to have a lower number of citations on average than the pharmaceutical
industry. Therefore, a patent in the computer industry, which was applied for in 1985 and which received 15 citations
by 2002 might not be directly comparable to a patent in the pharmaceutical industry applied for in 1995 and received
13 citations by 2002.
17As Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) explain, the “fixed effects” method described here is not equivalent to using
fixed effects in our regressions because the unit of the analysis in the construction of the dependent variables is the
patent and the unit of analysis in the regressions is the firm. For more details refer to Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg
(2001).
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as compared to a simple count of patents.
Explanatory Variables
The data on assets (Assets), sales (Sales), industry SIC, R&D expenditures (RD), book equity
(Equity), debt (Debt), net property plant and equipment (PPE ), cash (Cash), operating profits
(EBIDTA), market to book (Q) and retained earnings (RetEarn) comes from Compustat. We
require that firms in our sample have information on sales. The final sample includes 11,125 firms
that have publicly traded stock (109,500 firm years), 1,777 of which have registered a patent in
one or more years during the sample period (16,980 firm years). We now describe the construction
of the main explanatory variables used in our empirical analysis.
The key explanatory variables of interest in our analysis are the proxies for arm’s length financ-
ing. The first variable that proxies for arm’s length financing is equity. We measure this variable
as EquityAssets where Equity is the firm’s book equity and Assets are the total assets of the firm.
18 The
second variable used to proxy for arm’s length financing is the amount of the firm’s public debt.
To collect information on public debt issues, we use SDC Platinum. We merge the public debt
issuers sample (from 1970) with Compustat by matching cusips. Using the information on public
debt issue and maturity of the debt, we wrote a program to construct the amount of public debt
outstanding for each firm in a given year. We measure this variable as PublicAssets where Public is the
amount of public debt of the firm.19 Our third proxy measures access to the public market. We
construct two alternative variables that proxy for the access to public debt markets, closely fol-
lowing Houston and James (1996; 2001) and Hadlock and James (2002) who argue that if a firm
has public debt, its borrowing is arm’s length. First, we construct a dummy variable Publics that
takes the value of 1, if the firm has public debt outstanding in the current year t or any year before
that, as reported in SDC, and 0 otherwise. We also follow Faulkender and Petersen (2004) and use
the debt rating reported in Compustat as a proxy for whether the firm has access to public debt
markets. Compustat reports whether the firm has a bond rating or a commercial paper rating. If
the firm has either of them, we code the firm as having access to public debt financing. Therefore,
we create an indicator variable Publicc, which takes value of 1, if the firm has a public debt rating
in the current year t or any year before that, and 0 otherwise. In our sample, Publicc and Publics
observations overlap to the extent of 90.9%.
In our empirical specification, we follow Hall and Ziedonis (2001) among others and include the
log of R&D expenditures (Log(RD)) and firm size (Log(Sales)) as control variables. For robustness,
18We also repeat all our analysis replacing book equity by market equity and find qualitatively similar results.
19Note that, to the extent that some firms might be buying back or retiring their public debt, our measure Public
Assets
might over-report public debt in their capital structure. On the other hand since SDC reports debt issues from 1970
onwards, there might be cases where we under-report public debt in the capital structure as well. To examine if the
noise might be serious, we take a random sample of 25 firms with public debt outstanding in 1985 and 1995. We
collect the information on the proportion of public debt for these firms by looking in their proxy filings, 10Ks and
annual report filings. We find that the amount reported in these statements is close to the information we collected
from SDC (margin of error was less than 5%).
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we use the number of employees in the firm as an alternative proxy for firm size. We also control
for industry competition using an industry sales Herfindahl index (HI ) constructed at the 4 digit
SIC level and, for robustness, at the Fama and French (1997) 48 industry level. The data used to
construct the market and firm stock returns comes from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP). We also use CRSP to construct the variable that measures the age of the firm (Age). We
construct this measure based on the years from a firm’s IPO as reported in CRSP.
III.B. Model Specification
To test our empirical predictions, we will use two main specifications. Whenever the dependent
variable is a count variable (Patent, Drastic, DrasticTech) we follow the literature (e.g., Griliches et
al., 1984; Cockburn and Henderson, 1998) and use a Poisson regression model. Following Griliches
and Pakes (1980), we assume that the innovation counts (defined below in terms of patents) are
generated by a production function Y = f (X, γ), where Y is the number of innovations, X is
a vector of explanatory variables and γ is a vector of parameters. The single parameter of the
Poisson distribution function is λ, which is an exponential function of the explanatory variables
and is related to Y and X in the following way:




itγ + βt + βI + βs
]
. (E-4)
Here i indexes the firm, t indexes the year, s indexes the state, and I indexes the industry. βt,
βI and βs capture the year, industry and state fixed effects. Using time fixed effects controls for
any time trends (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001), changes in patenting patterns over time (Kortum and
Lerner, 2000) and prevailing market conditions. Using industry and state fixed effects control for
any industry and state wide differences in firm R&D and innovative intensity (Kortum and Lerner,
2000; Hall et al., 2005). For constructing industry dummies, we classify industries at a 4 digit
SIC level and check for robustness using the 48 industry classification used in Fama and French
(1997). We estimate this model by maximum likelihood for the Poisson distribution. Gouriéroux,
Montfort, and Trognon (1984) show that since the Poisson model is in the linear exponential class,
the Poisson coefficient estimates are consistent if the mean specification is correct and the robust
standard errors are consistent even under a misspecification of the distribution. Hence we report
robust standard errors.
Two of the control variables, Sales and R&D expenditure, which proxy for size, are log trans-
formed, while the other explanatory variables (Zit) are in levels. Zit includes our main variable
that proxies for arm’s length financing and other explanatory variables such as operating earn-
ings, market to book ratio, asset tangibility, cash, retained earnings, age of the firm and industry
concentration. As a result our basic specification is:
E[Yit] = λit = exp [γ1Log(RD)it + γ2Log(Sales)it + δZit] . (E-5)
19
In our model, coefficients on Sales and R&D have a constant elasticity interpretation, which implies
that a 1% increase in these variables increases the dependent variable by γ1% (or γ2%). All other








which implies that a unit increase in the explanatory variable increases the dependent variable by
δ%.
Whenever the dependent variable is not a count variable (Patentc, CitedPatentsTime, Cited-
PatentsT ime−Tech or CitedPatentsQuasi), we use a PCSE (panel corrected standard error) specifica-
tion. This specification adjusts for contemporaneous correlation and heteroskedasticity among the
firm patents as well as for the autocorrelation in each firm’s patents (Beck and Katz, 1995). Our
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, (E-7)
where the variables are as defined above. We would like to point out that R&D expenditure
enters contemporaneously in our production function. We don’t include lags since past literature
(Griliches et al., 1986; Montalvo, 1997) concludes that the lag R&D structure is poorly identified
due to high within-firm correlation of R&D spending over time.
IV. Empirical Results
IV.A. Descriptive Statistics
Sample properties of the main variables involved in our analysis are briefly described in Table I. In
Panel A we present descriptive statistics for firms with one or more patent grants over the sample
period compared to firms that did not receive any patents (the median number of patents per firm
in our the sample is 0). As indicated by the mean values reported in the table, firms with patents
are larger (sales of $2.7 billion vs. $0.9 billion per year), have higher R&D expenditure ($111
million vs. $38 million per year), have a higher market to book ratio (1.86 vs. 1.60 ) and belong
to more concentrated industries (Herfindahl index of 0.49 vs. 0.43 ). Firms with patents over the
sample period have a higher mean public debt to asset ratio (0.05 vs. 0.02 per year) and have
a higher mean equity to asset ratio (0.54 vs. 0.49 per year) compared to firms without patents.
Moreover, on average, as compared to firms that did not receive any patents, firms with patents
have a larger proportion of firms accessing the public debt market (0.35 vs. 0.12 per year). The
differences in various statistics between the two groups of firms are significant at the 1% level.
These univariate comparisons are in line with our predictions that firms with patents should have
a higher equity to asset ratio and a higher public debt to asset ratio.20
20Interestingly, the differences in the two samples are not on account of differences in R&D intensity ( RD
Sales
) –
which is approximately the same in both samples.
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In Panel B of Table I we compare, among the firms that have patents in a given year, the
characteristics of the firms with above and below the median number of citation weighted patents
(Median=7; Mean=5). Firms with above median citation weighted patents are, on average, larger,
have higher R&D expenditure, have more tangible assets, have a higher market to book ratio, have
a higher public debt to asset and equity to asset ratio and have a larger proportion of firms accessing
the public debt market. The differences in capital structure are again in line with our expectations.
Finally, in Panel C, we present the pairwise correlations between our key explanatory variables. As
is indicated in the table, there is little evidence of collinearity among our variables. Since these are
only summary statistics, for more meaningful comparisons, we next turn to multivariate analysis.
IV.B. Multivariate Analysis: Patents
In Table II we report our first set of regression results. We use a fixed effects Poisson panel
regression to relate the type of financing to the number of innovations, controlling for various firm
and industry characteristics. Specifically, we estimate the following model in Columns (1) to (6)
using the simple patent count Patent as a dependent variable:
Patentit = λit = exp
{
αFinancingit + γ1Log(RD)it + γ2Log(Sales)it
+ δZit + Time F.E. + Industry F.E. + State F.E.
}
. (E-8)
In Column (7) we use a negative binomial model which accounts for the possible over-dispersion
of the count dependent variable. In Column (8) we use OLS with an alternative definition of our
dependent variable (Patentc) which, as mentioned earlier, accounts for the truncation of the patent
grants in the later years of the sample. The explanatory variables we are most interested in are
different proxies for arm’s length financing and are captured in Financing . In models (1) and (2)
we use only EquityAssets to proxy for arm’s length financing. In models (3) and (4) we also include public
debt dummy (Publicc and Publics, respectively), while in models (5) to (8) we use the proportion of
public debt ( PublicAssets) in addition to the public debt dummy (Public
s). As indicated in the hypothesis
section, both access to the public debt market and extent of public debt financing may be associated
with greater innovative activity.
Following the literature (e.g., Aghion et al., 2005), Z is the matrix of control variables which
includes industry concentration measured by the Herfindahl index (HI ) and the squared term of the
Herfindahl index to capture a possible non-linear relationship between competition and innovation.
Z also includes firm age (Age) and age square (Age2), where the age is measured by years since the
IPO to control for the possibility that maturity of the firm might be related to its innovativeness. In
the estimation, we also control for size, measured by sales (Log(Sales)) and investments in innovative
projects measured by R&D expenditures (Log(RD)). Finally, we also include as control variables,
the market to book ratio of the firm (Q), profitability of the firm (EBIDTAAssets ), operating cash (
Cash
Assets),
retained earnings (RetEarnAssets ) and asset tangibility (Tangible). Since Rajan and Zingales (1995) and
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others have shown that profitability, size, tangibility and market to book are associated with EquityAssets ,
inclusion of these variables in our model alleviates concerns about omitted variables. All regressions
in this table are estimated with time, state and industry fixed effects and the reported standard
errors are heteroskedastic consistent and also corrected for the panel.21
Our results are strongly supportive of our first prediction that arm’s length financing is positively
associated with innovation. Consistent with Prediction 1, we find that the estimated coefficient on
Equity
Assets is positive and significant at the 1% level in models (1) to (8). This is consistent with
the literature that finds a positive association between equity and R&D expenditure (Titman and
Wessels 1988; Hall, 1990; Greenwald, Salinger, and Stiglitz, 1992). Our finding is different, however,
since we find a positive relationship between innovative output of the firm, while controlling for
its R&D expenditure. Similarly, consistent with the first prediction, the estimated coefficient on
the public debt dummy (Publicc or Publics) in models (3) and (4) and on the proportion of public
debt ( PublicAssets) in models (5) to (8) is positive and significant at the 1% level.
22 Note that both the
amount of public debt and the public debt dummy are significant suggesting that, consistent with
the discussion in the model section, both the access to public debt market and the proportion of
public debt may be important for the firm’s innovative activity.
In all the regression models, the coefficients on HI are positive while the coefficients on HI2 are
negative. Both estimates are highly significant. Such a non-monotonic relationship is in line with
Aghion et al. (2005) that reports a non-monotonic relationship between R&D expenditure and
industry concentration. This finding has been interpreted as suggesting that while some monopoly
power encourages innovation, too much does not. Other firm specific control variables are significant
as well. Consistent with the findings in the literature (e.g., Griliches, 1990; Caves, 1998), our
estimates indicate that firms with more R&D expenditures create more patents. The coefficient on
Log(Sales) is positive indicating that larger firms develop more innovations in our sample. More
mature firms (Age) are found to create more innovations, though the economic significance of the
estimate is small. We also find that the coefficient on Age2 is negative but insignificant. Our results
also indicate that firms with higher market to book, more tangible assets and higher profitability
create more innovations.
In model (6), we repeat our estimation after inclusion of firm fixed effects. Inclusion of firm
fixed effects alleviates concerns that unobservable firm specific differences in the cross-section might
be affecting our estimates. The qualitative nature of our results is unchanged. This indicates that
the effect of arm’s length financing on innovation is evident in a time series form as well. Intuitively,
21Standard errors in the Poisson models throughout the paper are heteroskedastic consistent to control for over
dispersion and are corrected for the panel.
22It is worth noting that the proportion of public debt is not just another proxy for leverage. If that was the case
we would expect to find a negative relationship between public debt and innovation because the existing empirical
evidence demonstrates a positive relationship between the presence of public debt and leverage (Faulkender and
Petersen, 2004 and Table IX in this paper), and a negative relationship between leverage and R&D (Titman and
Wessels, 1988).
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on average an increase in the equity or public debt in a firm’s capital structure is associated with
the firm creating more innovations. Our results are robust to an alternative model specification
(negative binomial) in Column (7).23 Finally, in model (8) we use the alternative definition of
our dependent variable (Patentc) with OLS specification. The results in Table II are economically
significant. Specifically, in Column (8) of Table II, controlling for other factors at their mean levels,
a 1 standard deviation (henceforth, SD) increase in EquityAssets is associated with a 47% increase in
patents produced. Similarly a 1 SD increase in PublicAssets is associated with a 12% increase in patents
produced. Moreover, access to public debt markets is associated with 6% more patents as compared
to firms that do not have access to the public debt market. Note that the elasticity of innovations
to R&D expenditure is .40 in Column (5) which is similar to previous findings (e.g., Griliches et
al., 1984; Cockburn and Henderson, 1996; Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Lerner, 2005). The estimated
elasticity is between 0 and 1, indicating no increasing returns to scale. This coefficient implies
that a doubling of R&D expenditures is associated with a 40% increase in the number of patents
created by the firm. Overall, the results in this section strongly support our first prediction.
IV.C. Multivariate Analysis: Citation Weighted Patents
We next investigate the relationship between the financing variables and patents that are more
significant. Based on Prediction 2, we expect a positive association between arm’s length financ-
ing and more novel patents. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, we expect this relationship to be
stronger than the relationship between arm’s length financing and a simple patent count since, by
construction, novel patents account for both the significance as well as the number of patents.
As discussed in the data section, we follow the established literature and measure the novelty of
a patent by the number of forward citations that a certain patent receives (e.g., Trajtenberg, 1990).
The three alternative measures used in this section are: (i) CitedPatentTime which measures the
citation weighted patents produced by a firm per year (Table III); (ii) Drastic which is a count of
the number of breakthrough or novel patents produced by the firm in a given year (Table IV) and
(iii) An indicator variable which measures whether a firm is in the top 1 percent of all citations per
patent received per year in a given technology class or not (Table V). Other alternative dependent
variables that we employed are discussed in the robustness section. The model specifications and
the results are described below.
We start our analysis in Table III, where we use the fixed effect panel regression to study
the relationship between a firm’s CitedPatentTime and its financing arrangements. Specifically, we
23Following Cameron and Trivedi (1998), we also perform a Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for overdispersion of
the negative binomial type in all our tests. We find that for all our tests the negative binomial model is rejected in





α0 + αFinancingit + γ1Log(RD)it + γ2Log(Sales)it
+ δZit + Time F.E. + Industry F.E. + State F.E.
}
. (E-9)
The control variables (Z ) are the same as the ones used in Table II. Consistent with our second
prediction, the Financing variables are statistically significant and positively associated with more
novel innovations. Since citation weighting of patents accounts for both the number and significance
of patents done by the firm, we expect that the association between arm’s length financing and
innovation to be stronger for citation weighted patents compared to number of patents alone.
Comparing estimates on the Financing variables in model (8) of Table II, where we used a similar
specification, with estimates in model (4) of Table III, we see that the economic significance of
the variables that proxy for arm’s length financing is larger in magnitude. Specifically, controlling
for other factors at their mean levels, a 1 SD increase in EquityAssets is associated with 57% more
citation weighted patents. Similarly a 1 SD increase in PublicAssets is accompanied by 20% more citation
weighted patents. We also find that access to public debt markets is associated with 13% more
citation weighted patents as compared to firms that do not have access to the public debt market.
We next analyze whether the type of financing is related to a count of breakthrough (Drastic)
patents. Specifically, we estimate the following Poisson model in Columns (1) to (4) of Table IV:
Drasticit = λit = exp
{
αFinancingit + γ1Log(RD)it + γ2Log(Sales)it
+ δZit + Time F.E. + Industry F.E. + State F.E.
}
. (E-10)
The dependent variable is Drastic and the control variables are the same as used in Table II.
Comparing estimates in model (5) of Table II, where we used a similar specification, with estimates
in model (3) of Table IV, it is clear that the economic significance of the variables that proxy for
arm’s length financing is larger for the breakthrough patents. Specifically, controlling for other
factors at their mean levels, a 1 SD increase in EquityAssets is associated with 60% more drastic patents
produced and a 1 SD increase in PublicAssets is associated with 33% more drastic patents produced.
Furthermore, access to public debt markets is associated with 12% more drastic patents as compared
to firms that do not have access to the public debt market. In model (4), we re-estimate our model
with firm fixed effects and find similar results. This reconfirms that our results hold both in time-
series as well as in the cross-section. We also use a negative binomial specification in model (5) and
find that our results are qualitatively similar. Finally, in model (6), we use an alternative definition
of our dependent variable (CitedPatentsQuasi) and use an OLS specification. Again as shown in the
table our results are robust to this alternative definition of novel innovation.
Next, we conduct two additional tests to confirm that arm’s length financing is more strongly
associated with drastic innovations than with the simple count of patents – many of which may be
incremental. To do this, we first investigate the relationship between arm’s length financing and
more cited patents, restricting the sample to only include firms that have patents in a given year.
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Then we conduct a second test where we compare firms that create novel innovations to firms with
patents that are likely to be only incremental.
For the first test, our sample includes only firms that have at least one patent (Patent>0 )
during a given year. Since all firms innovate, restricting the sample in this way can help establish
if the impact of the type of financing is greater on more cited innovations than on innovations in
general. Specifically, we re-estimate (E-9) on this sample. The results are reported in Column (1)
and (2) of Table V. The coefficients on EquityAssets , Public
s and PublicAssets are positive and significant at
1% level. These results are consistent with the notion that the form of financing has a significantly
greater influence on novel innovations than on a simple count of patents. The results also assure us
that our previous findings in the full sample of firms are not biased in some manner by the inclusion
of firms that don’t have any patents. Note that the coefficients on the Financing variables in these
equations are as economically meaningful as the coefficients we obtained earlier.24 For robustness,
we re-estimate our model restricting the sample to firms with at least one patent over the entire
sample period and find similar results.
In models (3) and (4) of Table V, we compare firms with novel innovations to firms with
patents that are likely to be only incremental. Specifically, we construct an indicator variable
called DrasticIncrem which equals 1 if a firm is in the top 1% of firms ranked by the number of
citations per patent received per year in a given technology class, and 0 if a firm is ranked among
the bottom 30%. Restricting the comparison within the technology class controls for any cohort
effect. We estimate the following panel fixed effects logit regression:
DrasticIncremit = Φ
{
α0 + αFinancingit + γ1Log(RD)it + γ2Log(Sales)it
+δZit + Time F.E. + Industry F.E. + State F.E.
}
. (E-11)
As reported, the coefficient estimates on EquityAssets , Public
s and PublicAssets are positive and significant
and confirm that firms with arm’s length financing are more likely to be drastic innovators than
incremental innovators. For robustness, we try alternative cutoffs of 2% and 5% for the drastic
innovators and 40% and 50% for the incremental innovators and find that the results are unaffected
by these alternative cutoffs. Our results in this subsection strongly support our second prediction.
V. Further Tests and Robustness
In this section, we test some extensions of our predictions and investigate the robustness of our
main results by examining alternative explanations. In subsection A, we analyze the impact of a
24From estimates in models (2) and (3) of Table V, firms with 1 SD increase in Equity
Assets
is associated with 25% more
citation weighted patents and a 1 SD increase in Public
Assets
is associated with 10% more citation weighted patents when
compared to firms that produce mean citation weighted patents among the firms that innovate. Furthermore, access
to public debt markets is associated with 4.5% more citation weighted patents as compared to firms that do not have
access the public debt market, among the firms that innovate.
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firm’s financial constraints on its innovative activity and on our main findings. Specifically, we are
interested in investigating the extent to which the results on arm’s length financing are a reflection
of financial constraints. In subsection B, we examine whether our main results are affected because
of inadequate controls for differences in firm characteristics in our earlier tests. In subsection C, we
analyze the innovation output of firms after they issue public debt for the first time or issue public
equity through a seasoned equity offering (SEO). In subsection D, we conduct instrumental variable
analysis to control for possible coefficient bias due to omitted variables. In subsection E, we focus
on firms that do not access the public debt market during our sample period, and examine whether
borrowing from multiple banks vs. borrowing from a single bank is positively associated with
innovation. The notion is that borrowing from multiple banks results in financing with attributes
similar to arm’s length financing. In subsection F, we explore the relationship between the quality
of innovations created by a firm and its subsequent market valuation, operating performance and
abnormal stock returns. Finally, in subsection G, we conduct additional miscellaneous robustness
tests. For brevity, we discuss the results without reporting them in many instances in this section.
All these results can be obtained by requesting the authors.
V.A. Financial Constraints
A question that has received attention in the literature is the extent to which the availability of
financial resources affects a firm’s ability to invest. Within the context of investments in R&D,
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) show that, due to capital market imperfections, internal cash is
the primary source of financing of R&D expenditures for a panel of small high-tech firms. To the
extent that access to arm’s length markets might suggest lower financial constraints, this offers an
alternative explanation for our findings – financially unconstrained firms innovate and financially
constrained firms don’t. In this sub-section we examine how such financial constraints might be
affecting the estimates in our analysis. Note that our main regression results (Table II to Table V)
suggest that, although important, internal finance accounts for only some part of the relationship
between the choice of financing and innovation.25 Below, we analyze in greater detail the importance
of financial constraints.
We follow Lamont, Polk and Saa-Requejo (2001) and Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003) and
construct the five-variable Kaplan Zingales index (KZ index) for each firm-year to measure the
strength of financial constraints faced by the firm. Underlying the KZ index is the work by Kaplan
and Zingales (1997), who undertake an in-depth study of the financial constraints faced by a
sample of 49 low-dividend manufacturing firms. Using both subjective and objective criteria, they
rank these firms on an ordinal scale, from the least to most-obviously financially constrained.
25Specifically, despite the fact that we had included three measures of internal finance, namely operating income
(EBIDTA
Assets
), operating cash ( Cash
Assets
) and retained earnings (RetEarn
Assets
), our measures of arm’s length financing are
statistically and economically significant.
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Most useful for our purposes, they then estimate an ordered logit regression which relates their
qualitative ranking (mapped into a 1-to-5 scale, where 1 indicates no constraint and 5 a certain
constraint) to five Compustat variables. This regression attaches positive weight to market to book
and leverage, and negative weight to operating cash flow, cash balances, and dividends. The KZ
index is constructed as:










where CFAssets is cash flow over lagged assets;
Div
Assets is cash dividends over assets;
Cash
Assets is cash
balances over assets; DebtAssets is the leverage ; and Q is the market value of equity over assets.
For each year, we rank firms into quintiles according to their KZ index, and test the significance
of the external and internal financing variables in each KZ quintile. The quintile ranking procedure
is similar to the one used by Baker, Stein and Wurgler (2003). Specifically, for each KZ quintile,
we estimate the following panel regression:
Patentit =
{
α0 + αFinancingit + γ1Log(RD)it + γ2Log(Sales)it
+ δZit + Time F.E. + Industry F.E. + State F.E.
}
. (E-13)
Controls in each case include all the variables used in Table III. In each case, we estimate regressions
with time, state and industry fixed effects. It is worth noting that the average sales of firms in 1987
in the Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) sample was $ 39 mil. As compared to that, the average
sales of firms in each of the quintiles (from the least to most financially constrained in terms of
1987 dollars) are ($ 1094 mill), ($ 1050 mill), ($ 753 mill), ($ 397 mill) and ($ 310 mill). Thus,
intuitively, we might expect the effects found by Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) to be mainly
present in the quintile consisting of most financially constrained firms.
The results reported in Panel A of Table VI demonstrate a positive and significant association
between arm’s length financing variables (EquityAssets and
Public
Assets) and patents for each of the KZ quin-
tiles.26 The fact that we find a positive association between arm’s length financing and innovation
in all KZ quintiles implies that arm’s length financing is not a simple proxy for the presence of
financial constraints. Consistent with Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), we find that internal cash
( CashAssets) is positively related to patents for the most financially constrained companies in quintile
(Q5). However, for the other qunitiles (Q1 to Q4), we find an insignificant or even a negative
relationship between innovation and internal cash. The finding of a negative association in less
constrained quintiles is somewhat surprising and suggests that the presence of excess internal cash
(relative to the industry mean)27 is potentially associated with greater agency costs – which in turn
hinder innovation.28
26For conciseness, we do not report the coefficients of the other control variables (including Publics) in the table.
The estimates of the control variables are similar in sign and magnitude to those reported in our main regressions.
27Note that we estimate our regressions with industry fixed effects. Thus, the interpretation of a firm’s Cash
Assets
on
innovation in the regression is relative to the industry mean Cash
Assets
.
28The presence of excess internal cash proxying for agency problems has been documented, for instance, in Harford
(1999) who shows that firms with large cash reserves make poor acquisition decisions.
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We repeat the analysis using the dependent variable CitedPatentTime to examine if our second
prediction holds in each of the KZ quintiles. Our results are reported in Panel B. Comparing the
estimates on EquityAssets and
Public
Assets in each KZ quintile in Panel B with the corresponding estimates
in Panel A, it is clear that the positive and significant association between arm’s length financing
variables and innovation is stronger, when innovation is measured by citation weighted patents,
rather than by a simple patent count. This finding is again consistent with our second prediction.
Note that internal cash is also positively associated with novel innovation only for firms in the most
financially constrained quintile.
For robustness we use alternative methods to measure financial constraints. Specifically, we
repeat the analysis in this subsection following the methodology of Korajczyk and Levy (2003)
and Whited and Wu (2005) for classifying firms as constrained.29 We again find support for our
predictions in both the constrained and unconstrained set of firms. Overall the evidence in this
section suggests that financial constraints and internal financing alone cannot explain our main
findings, although they may have a role to play in explaining innovative activity.
V.B. Quintile Analysis
In this subsection, we conduct stricter tests to account for the effect of firm characteristics on our
results. We divide the sample into quintiles formed on the basis of various firm characteristics
such as sales, market-to-book ratio, age, operating income and operating cash. Sorting firms into
quintiles helps allay the concern that the positive relationship between arm’s length financing and
innovation may be the result of fundamental differences in size, R&D expenditure, market to book,
age, internal cash or profitability of firms that are not adequately captured by our control variables
or by the KZ analysis in the previous section.
We conduct our analysis in two steps. Specifically, in the first step, for each year we sort all
firms into quintiles based on one of the firm characteristics mentioned above. In the second step,
for each quintile, we estimate (E-13) where the dependent variable is CitedPatentTime. Controls
in each estimation include all the variables used in the model in Table III. Specifically, we match
firms into quintiles based on Sales in Panel A, Q in Panel B, Age in Panel C, CashAssets in Panel D
and EBIDTAAssets in Panel E. In each case, we estimate regressions with time, state and industry fixed
effects.
Our results are reported in Panels A to E of Table VII and indicate that even after grouping
firms by their firm characteristics, for every quintile, firms with more equity and more public debt
29Korajczyk and Levy use the criterion for classifying constrained firms as: Div = 0 and Q > 1; Whited and Wu
construct an index based on a structural model as: −0.091 CF
Assets
− 0.062 DIVPOS + 0.021 TLTD − 0.044 Size +
0.102 ISGit − 0.035 SG, where TLTD is the ratio of the long term debt to total assets; DIVPOS is an indicator
that takes the value of one if the firm pays cash dividends; SG is firm sales growth and ISG is the firm’s three-digit
industry sales growth. A higher value of this index represents a financially constrained firm.
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tend to innovate more. In particular, note that our results hold for a range of sales quintiles ($4
mill to $1848 mill), market to book quintiles (0.7 to 4.6) and age quintiles (1.99 yrs to 31.9 yrs).
Most importantly, the results also hold in the range of R&D quintiles ($0.3 mill to $92 mill) – again
suggesting that our results are obtained after controlling for the investment side of innovation
using R&D expenditures.30 This section provides additional robust evidence that our results are
not being unduly driven by a few specific firms or firm characteristics.
V.C. Innovations Subsequent to a First Time Public Debt Offering or a Sea-
soned Equity Offering (SEO)
In this subsection we investigate the relationship between arm’s length financing and innovation by
examining changes in innovative activity following significant changes in arm’s length financing by
the firm. More specifically, we analyze the innovative activity of firms that issue public debt for the
first time or issue public equity through a seasoned equity offering (SEO).31 Consistent with our
model, we expect firms to issue equity or public debt if they anticipate an increase in their innovative
activity. Since we examine the same firm before and after the issue, we have a substantially direct
test of whether financing from arm’s length markets is associated with a subsequent increase in
innovative activity.
We examine the change in the innovative activity of firms subsequent to the two types of events,
by constructing the dummy variable, PostD2 (Post
E
2 ), that takes a value 1 for the two years since
the firm issued public debt for the first time (issued equity through an SEO) over the sample
period, and 0 otherwise. To measure whether the innovative activity is affected over longer time







a value 1 in the third and third and fourth years since the firm issued public debt for the first
time (issued equity through an SEO) over the sample period and 0 otherwise. For construction
of these variables, we collect data on all public debt issues and SEOs available in SDC database.
After matching the firms (by cusip) with our patent and financial data, we find that we have 1,239
firms that issued public debt for the first time and 2,845 firms (4,166 issues) that issued SEOs
during the sample period. For our analysis, we use this sample and estimate the following model
30To save on space, we report only the coefficients of our main explanatory variables. The coefficients of the control
variables (including Publics) are similar in sign and magnitude to those reported in our main regressions. Notably,
consistent with Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), we find that Cash
Assets
is positive in the lowest sales and age quintiles
(Q1 and Q2). We do not report the results for R&D quintiles in the table since the estimates are very similar to those
reported for the sales quintiles in Panel A. We also find that the results hold when we use Patent as the dependent
variable instead.
31The reason we focus on the first issue of public debt is that it is likely to represent a substantial change in the
arm’s length financing available to the firm. Not only is arm’s length capital raised, but the offering also establishes
access to and likelihood of future offerings in the public debt market. Also, though we would like to assess the change
in innovative activity of firms subsequent to an IPO, we are unable to do so since we do not have detailed financial
data before the firm goes public.
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where k ∈ {D, E} corresponds to the first time public debt issue and the SEO respectively and
l ∈ {2− 3, 2− 4} corresponds to third and third and fourth year subsequent to the first time public
debt issue or a SEO. More precisely, in Columns (1), (2) and (3) of Table VIII we estimate the
model using variables that capture two, three and four years subsequent to the first time issue of
public debt and in Columns (4), (5) and (6) we estimate the model using variables that capture
two, three and four years subsequent to the SEO. Based on our hypothesis, we expect the coefficient
estimate on Postk2(β0) to be positive. Controls in each case include all the variables used in the
model in Table III.32 We also estimate these regressions with time, state and industry fixed effects
and correct the standard errors for the panel.
As is evident from the table, the results are consistent with our hypothesis – firms which issue
public debt for the first time (do an SEO) have more valuable innovations as measured by citation
weighted patents in the years subsequent to the first time issue of public debt (SEO). In particular,
the coefficient estimates on PostD2 (Post
E
2 ) are positive and significant at 1% level. The estimates
are economically significant and indicate that firms which issue public debt for the first time (do
an SEO) experienced a 26% (39%) increase in the citation weighted patents two years after the
issue of public debt (public equity), other things equal.
Note that the estimates on Postk2−3 and Post
k
2−4 for three and four years after the initial issue
of public debt (after an SEO) in models (2) and (3) (models (5) and (6)) are small in magnitude
(about 5-7%) compared to the estimate for the first two years after the public debt issue (after the
SEO). This suggests that the increase in innovative activity is relatively short-lived and that firms
may be issuing public debt (issuing equity) in anticipation of a burst of innovative activity. Our
results are robust to alternative dependent variable definitions and model specifications.33 Overall,
our findings in this section provide substantial evidence that obtaining additional arm’s length
financing is followed by at least two years of increase in innovative activity.34





a modified financing variables Public#s which like Publics takes a value 0 for all the years when the firm does not




2−4, it takes a value of 0 for 2, 3 and 4
years respectively after a firm issues public debt for the first time. After the first 2, 3 and 4 years this dummy takes
a value 1.
33In particular, besides using Drastic as a dependent variable with a Poisson estimation specification, we also
conducted the estimation using CitedPatentTime and a Tobit regression. Using Tobit alleviates concerns that our
results in this section are partly driven by a significant number of firms with zero patents. Specifically, since the
number of citation weighted patents per firm is a non-negative number, it can either remain at zero or increase for
these firms. Thus, when we examine the innovative activity of firms after an event, there may be an upward bias on
the coefficient estimate on Postk2 .
34Note that, our estimation in this section, though similar to a firm fixed effects estimation, differs in an important
30
V.D. Instrumental Variable Estimation
In this subsection we examine if the economic impact of public debt on innovation might be due to
the omission of unobserved variables in our specification – specifically related to public debt financ-
ing. In particular, an alternative hypothesis is that a positive and strongly significant association
between public debt and innovation exists since there is something fundamentally different about
firms that borrow from public debt markets – differences not being captured by our current model
specification. To address this issue, we employ a two equation instrumental variable (IV) model.35
We estimate this IV model with two alternative techniques – the control function approach (with
CitedPatentTime as dependent variable and OLS specification in second stage) and the Generalized
Method of Moments (with Drastic as dependent variable and Poisson specification in second stage).
The first equation of the model explains firm’s choice of public debt financing and the second equa-
tion estimates the creation of novel innovations. Appendix C briefly discusses the methodology
that we use to obtain the results that we discuss below.
We start by estimating a first stage equation that explains whether or not the firm chooses to






β0 + β1{EquityAssets }it + β2Sizeit + β3Qit + β4Tangibleit
+β5σfirm,it + β6Ageit + β7{EBIDTAAssets }it + β8KZit
+ γ
′





Our dependent variable is Publics.36 Following the literature that explains the choice of public debt
financing (e.g., Hadlock and James (2002)), we include firm level control variables Size, EquityAssets , Q,
Age, EBIDTAAssets and Tangible. We decompose firm’s stock return variance into firm specific, industry
specific and market specific components and include the firm specific component of the stock return
variance (σfirm,it) as an additional control.37 We follow the procedure in Campbell et al. (2001)
dimension. As can be seen from our earlier results, a fixed effects estimation, while affecting our results modestly,
results in a loss of data during the estimation. To the extent that there is some information contained in the between
panel estimator, our procedure results in better estimates than what we would have obtained by employing firm fixed
effects and losing observations.
35There is also a possibility of simultaneity bias due to the fact that once the public debt is in place it might have
an independent effect on innovation. Using an IV model also ensures that the estimates of our model are not affected
by this type of bias.
36Note that the choice of public debt – the endogenous variable we need to instrument in the second stage equation
– appears both directly (Publics) and indirectly in the proportion of public debt ( Public
Assets
). Therefore, when we
instrument, we perform two first stage estimations - one for Publics and another for the ratio Public
Assets
(unreported).
37We also estimate the first stage using the overall stock return variance instead of the three decomposed terms
and find results similar to Hadlock and James (2002) who include this variable to capture information asymmetry.
Since the literature (e.g., Campbell et al., 2001) interprets the firm specific component of stock return volatility as
capturing information asymmetry, we include this as a control rather than as an instrument. This addresses the
concern that firm’s information asymmetry may be related to its innovation, independent of public debt.
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for this decomposition (discussed in Appendix E). We estimate the regressions with time and
industry fixed effects and report the results in Table IX.
For estimating the second stage equation (innovation equation), we require at least one of the
explanatory variables in the first stage equation to be an instrument in the second stage, i.e., it has
to be uncorrelated to innovation except through public debt. To this end, we use several alternative
instruments in our analysis. In model (1), we use the industry component of the firm’s stock return
variance (σind,t) as an instrument. We take industry related stock return volatility of the firm as
an instrument since, for instance, Cantillo and Wright (2000) argue that industry volatility can
influence the choice of public debt financing. In models (2) and (3), we follow Faulkender and
Petersen (2004) and include two more instruments. The first one is based on how well known or
visible the firm is. The notion is that better known firms will find it easier to access public bond
markets. As a measure of whether the firm is widely known to the markets we construct a dummy
variable, S&P 500, which takes a value 1 if the firm is in the S&P 500 Index in a given year and
0 otherwise. In model (3), we use the Log of one plus the percentage of firms in the industry of a
given firm in a year (Log(1+%Public)) that have public debt as an instrument. The notion here
is that the probability of a firm having public debt is also related to how unique the firm is. For
instance, a new firm which manufactures autos may be able to issue bonds more easily, since the
bond market already knows the industry and the competitors, as most auto manufacturers have
outstanding public debt. We believe that the instruments we have picked are not directly affecting
the nature of the firm’s innovative activity (we are not aware of any suggestion or evidence to the
contrary in the literature). In model (4), for robustness, we include all the instruments together.
As indicated in the table, our instruments are significant predictors of whether or not a firm
borrows from the public market. In particular, the probability of a firm choosing public debt
financing is negatively related to the industry specific variance of its stock returns and is positively
related to whether or not the firm is in the S&P 500 Index and to the proportion of firms in its
industry that have public debt. The coefficient estimates on the other variables in all the columns
indicate that the probability of a firm having public debt is positively related to Size, Tangible and
Age and negatively related to EBIDTAAssets , Q,
Equity
Assets and σfirm. The signs and significance of coefficient
estimates on these explanatory variables are similar to the results reported in Hadlock and James
(2002) and Faulkender and Petersen (2004).
We now discuss the results of our second stage regression. As discussed in the methodology
section, the second stage in CFA and GMM is different in that CFA uses an OLS specification while
the second stage in GMM uses a Poisson specification. Specifically, we estimate the second stage
after including the control function of residuals (CFA) and Φ(Z
′
β) (for GMM) from the first stage.
We construct three control functions and three Φ(Z
′
β)’s corresponding to models (1), (2) and (3)
of Table IX (first stage). These models correspond to σind, S&P 500 and (Log(1+%Public)) being
used as instruments in the first stage. Subsequently, in models (1), (2) and (3) of Table X, we use
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CFA and in models (4), (5) and (6) we use GMM. The other explanatory variables are the same
as the ones used in the basic regression in Table III. Our results using both CFA and GMM show
that the estimates of arm’s length financing variables are qualitatively similar to those in Table III
and Table IV respectively. However, a Hausman test (reported in notes to Table X) comparing the
estimates in Table IV with estimates in Table X suggests that controlling for a firm’s public debt
choice decision does have a small but statistically significant effect on the coefficient estimates.38
The economic significance indicated by the estimated coefficients on PublicAssets is close to those
reported in our initial estimations without instruments. In particular, firms with 1 SD more public
debt than average produce 18% more citation weighted patents. In unreported regressions, we
re-estimated the models in Table II using the control function approach (Patentc as dependent
variable) and GMM (Patent as dependent variable). Our coefficient estimates on the financing
variables are smaller than those reported in Table X. This suggests that the finding that financing
arrangements have a stronger influence on novel innovations than on innovations in general is robust
to IV estimation and again confirms our second prediction. The evidence in this section suggests
that our main results are largely unaffected even after controlling for a possible omitted variable
bias.
V.E. Another Proxy for Arm’s Length Financing
As an extension of our empirical analysis, we examine if among firms with no public debt access
in our sample, those with multiple banks display an innovation pattern closer to firms with public
debt access. Within the context of our model, having multiple banks resembles more arm’s length
financing than borrowing from a single bank, since for a given size of the initial investment, the
exposure of each bank is small. Therefore banks may not have the incentives to diligently investigate
the investment opportunity of the firm. Moreover, it might be more difficult for multiple banks
to act in a coordinated manner when they need to terminate the project. This notion also finds
support in the literature (e.g., Rajan, 1992; Houston and James, 1996; Thakor 1996). Therefore,
empirically, we expect a positive association between borrowing from multiple banks and the number
of citation weighted patents (and for patents in general).
To test this prediction, we start with firms that do not have public debt during the sample
period. For these firms, we create a variable Multiple, which takes a value of 0, if the firm borrows
from a single bank in the current year t or in any year before that, and 1 if the firm borrows from
multiple banks. To construct this variable, we gather data from the Loan Pricing Corporation’s
DealScan database, on the number of lead banks that a firm uses when it receives a bank loan
38In the CFA, we find that the residuals from the first stage are significant in the second stage regression. This
suggests that the choice of a firm to go to the public debt market has a discernable effect on the estimates in the
second stage. However, the difference in magnitude of the estimates on the relevant variables suggests that this effect
is small.
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(see Dahiya et al., 2003 for more detailed discussion on the DealScan database and identification of
lead banks). Consistent with Dahiya et al. (2003), we choose only lead banks to count the number
of lenders. Supporting banks, named by DealScan as Participants, are excluded from the count
since they only provide assistance and follow the direction of the lead banks. We match the data
from Dealscan to financial data from Compustat using tickers where available. However, Dealscan
does not provide tickers for all public companies that it covers and when it does, they are often
unreliable. Therefore, we increase our matched sample by hand after carefully checking company
names. In terms of sample size we would like to note two caveats. First, since the coverage of
firms in DealScan is relatively limited, the number of observations used in the tests that involve
the variable Multiple is much smaller than in other tests. Second, the coverage of DealScan begins
from 1985 and therefore our tests are run only for the 1985-2000 period. In our tests we have 2,896
firms and 7,190 firm years when we use Multiple. In our sample we find that, as compared to firms
that borrow from a single bank, firms that borrow from multiple banks are, on average, larger in
terms of sales ($3,137 mill vs. $410 mill), more profitable in terms of EBIDTAAssets (0.13 vs. 0.09) and
have lower cash to assets ratio (0.06 vs. 0.12). The characteristics of firms borrowing from multiple
vs. single banks in our sample are similar to those reported in Houston and James (2001).
We use fixed effect panel regression to study again the relationship between the number of cita-
tion weighted patents a firm produces in a given year and its financing arrangements. Specifically,
in Table XI we estimate (E-9) with Financing proxied by Multiple. The control variables are the
same as used in Table III. Houston and James (2001) show that, as compared to firms that bor-
row from multiple banks, firms borrowing from a single bank face ‘cash flow constraints’ for large
projects. We control for the size of investments for innovative projects by including Log(RD) and
include KZ as a control for financial constraints faced by the firm in model (3). As is reported in
the table, Multiple is statistically significant and positively associated with more novel innovations
in all the specifications used in the table. The estimates on the other arm’s length proxy EquityAssets are
also statistically significant. Our estimates are economically meaningful. Specifically, controlling
for other factors at their mean levels, among firms without public debt access, those which borrow
from multiple banks are likely to produce 5% more citation weighted patents than those borrowing
from a single bank. Despite the smaller sample size as compared to other tests, these results are
robust to using different specifications (negative binomial and Poisson) in models (4) and (5) and
alternative dependent variable definitions (Patentc in model (1), CitedPatentT ime in models (2) and
(3) and Drastic in models (4) and (5)). Note that we already control for financial constraints and
therefore our variable captures something more than the lack of resources to finance innovation. As
an additional test to ensure that our results are not affected by financial constraints, we conducted
the analysis in KZ quintiles following the methodology in Section V.A. Our results are similar to
those reported in Table XI.
To address concerns about a possible selection bias due to the imperfect matching from DealScan
to Compustat, we treat all the firms with cited innovations that do not borrow from public markets
34
and for which we don’t have banking information, as having a single bank relationship (i.e., Multi-
ple = 0). This biases our sample against finding any support for our corollary (i.e., against finding
support that firms with multiple bank relationship produce more novel innovations). We find that
our results remain significant, though the magnitude of the coefficients is marginally smaller. Over-
all the evidence indicates that firms that borrow from multiple banks create more novel innovations
(and innovations in general) as compared to firms that borrow from a single bank.
V.F. Innovation, Firm Value, Firm Performance and Stock Returns
In this subsection we investigate the impact of a firm’s innovative activity on its subsequent stock
market valuation. Our first objective is to establish an association between the quality of a firm’s
innovations as measured by citations weighted patents (revealed over time), and its future value and
operating performance. Based on previous work (Hall et al., 2005), we expect a positive association
between quality of a firm’s innovation and its future value. Another objective of our analysis is to
investigate the type of lag with which the market recognizes the value of a novel innovation after
the patent protection is sought. To the extent that patent applications may not be announced and,
even when announced, may be difficult for financial intermediaries and other market participants
to evaluate – we expect that information about the value of the innovation would only gradually
get incorporated into the firm’s market price. As a consequence, the firms with more novel and
significant innovations should have higher future abnormal returns – as the value of the innovation
is gradually recognized by the market – than firms that have no or only incremental innovations.
In Panel A of Table XII, we first examine the relationship between future market to book value
(Q) of firms sorted into quintiles based on the quality of their innovations. In particular, we first
sort all the firms which have at least one patent during the sample period each year into quintiles
based on CitedPatentTime. In the second step, for each of the quintiles, we estimate the following
model for firms in each quintile for each year :
yit+j =
{
γt + δZit + Industry F.E. + State F.E.
}
. (E-16)
Our dependent variable y is one, two and three year future Q in Columns (1) to (3). Following
Hall et al. (2005), we continue to conduct our analysis relative to the application year of patents
since the work surveyed in Griliches, Pakes, and Hall (1987) finds that patent counts by application
date are more tightly linked to market value than counts by granting date. We include the firm’s
Size and Age as control variables (Shin and Stulz, 2000). Since Daines (2001) finds that Q is
different for Delaware and non-Delaware firms, we include state dummies in our regression. Morck
and Yeung (2001) show that inclusion in the S&P 500 index has a positive impact on Q. Thus, we
include a dummy variable for S&P 500 inclusion as a control. We also control for other firm specific
characteristics like cash and operating profits. Finally, we include industry fixed effects to control
for cross industry differences in value and performance. For our inferences, we are interested in
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the difference in coefficient estimates γ between the first and the fifth quintile – since that can
be interpreted as the difference in value or performance between firms in the most and the least
innovative quintiles after controlling for other factors that explain future Q.
For our analysis, we use an estimation technique that is a variant of the methods of Fama
and MacBeth (1973). In particular, we estimate annual cross-sectional regressions of (E-16) with
statistical significance assessed within each year (by cross-sectional standard errors) and across all
years (with the time-series standard error of the mean coefficient). Panel A summarizes the results
for each quintile. Each row gives the Fama-MacBeth coefficient estimates of γ and standard errors
averaged across years of the sample. Specifically, the difference in the estimates of γ (26 in each
quintile) between the first and the last quintile in the last row of Panel A suggests that firms in the
highest citation weighted patent quintile have a 40% higher market to book value two years after
the innovation than firms in the lowest citation weighted patent quintile. Our results suggest that
novel innovations have a significant impact on firm value even after controlling for other factors
that might explain differences in value. This finding is consistent with Hall et al. (2005) who find
that firms having above median number of citations per patent display a significant value premium.
As shown in the table, these differences persist for upto two years subsequent to the sorting year
– suggesting the time period over which the value of the innovation is fully recognized. We find
qualitatively similar results when we examine the future operating performance (ROA) of firms
across the most and the least innovative quintiles. More precisely, we find that firms in the highest
citation weighted patent quintile have about 31.5% higher operating performance two years after
the innovation than firms in the lowest citation weighted patent quintile.
In Panel B of Table XII, we examine the relationship between future excess stock returns (R)
of firms sorted into quintiles based on the quality of their innovation. In particular, for each of the
quintiles formed as in Panel A, we estimate the following model for each year :
Rit+j =
{
αt + β1Rmt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt
}
. (E-17)
Our dependent variable is one year future stock returns (Rt+1) in Columns (1) and (4), two year
future stock returns (Rt+2) in Columns (2) and (5) and three year future stock returns (Rt+3) in
Columns (3) and (6). We follow prior research and estimate a 1-factor model for each quintile in
models (1) to (3) and use the Fama-French 3-factor model in models (4) to (6). In particular, we
control for excess value weighted market returns (Rm) in all the models. We also include SMB
(small minus big) and HML (high minus low) factors in models (4) to (6). Our interest is in the
difference of the coefficient estimate α between the first and the fifth quintile – since that can be
interpreted as the difference in excess returns between firms in the two quintiles after controlling
for appropriate risk factors.
As in Panel A, each row in Panel B gives the Fama-MacBeth coefficient estimate on α and
standard errors averaged across years of the sample. Specifically, the difference in estimate of α
between the first and the last quintile in the last row of Panel B suggests that firms in the highest
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citation weighted patent quintile have a 1.68% higher annual market adjusted return and a 1.80%
higher annual three factor adjusted return two years after the innovation than firms in the lowest
citation weighted patent quintile.39 Our results are consistent with the notion that the firm value
increases in response to creation of novel innovations – those that have a greater influence on
subsequent innovations. Again, it takes about two years for the information to be incorporated
into stock prices.40
V.G. Other Robustness Tests
We conduct several additional tests to verify the robustness of our main regression results that are
reported in Tables II and III. For conciseness, we discuss the results without reporting them. First,
since the NBER patent sample is primarily composed of firms that were publicly traded in 1989,
we examine if having more mature firms in later years in the sample induces a survivorship bias. In
principle, this can introduce a bias in the estimates if the mature firms present in the latter years
do most of the innovation and also have a predominantly arm’s length financed capital structure.
In Section V.B., we already demonstrated that this bias might not be substantial in our sample
since our results are valid in each of the quintiles sorted by firm age. To further allay concerns,
we follow the approach in Schoar (2002) and re-estimate the relationship between the innovations
and the type of financing for two sample periods: 1974 to 1987 and 1988 to 2000. The results of
this sub-period analysis suggest that a similar positive relation between the innovations and arm’s
length financing exists in both sample periods. We also re-estimate all our regressions with age
dummies in line with Oyer (2005) who argues that this approach alleviates survivorship bias of the
type we are concerned about. We find that our results are not affected.
Second, since Hall et al. (2005) show that the R&D and patenting intensity varies across indus-
tries, we examine how this might impact our results. To do this, we follow Hall et al. (2005) and
classify industries into 6 sectors. The industry sectors are: Drugs and Medical Instrumentation
(henceforth just “Drugs”); Chemicals; Computers and Communications (henceforth just “Com-
39While we advocate slow information revelation for novel innovations as the reason for this gradual value recogni-
tion by the market, another reason why we might find persistent abnormal return differences between the lowest and
highest citation weighted patent quintiles could be an omitted risk factor in the factor model. In unreported analysis,
we repeat the regressions with a 4-factor model (including momentum factor) and find that our results are similar.
Also note that the standard errors in the Fama-MacBeth regressions in this section are corrected for autocorrelation
up to four lags using the Newey and West procedure.
40We repeat the analysis by sorting firms into groups based on whether or not they patent. Since the median firm
in the sample does not patent, we are left with two groups. The results presented in this section (in both the Panels)
are qualitatively similar if we repeat the analysis focussing on the differences between these two groups instead of
the top and bottom quintile of firms sorted based on the quality of their innovation. We also conducted the entire
analysis in this section (for firms with patents) sorting firms based on simple patent count (Patent). Consistent with
Hall et al. (2005) our results are economically weaker than those reported in this section – suggesting the importance
of novelty of patents rather than a simple patent count.
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puters”); Electrical; Metals and Machinery; and miscellaneous (low-tech industries). The first five
industry sectors are the source for most of the patents in the manufacturing sector in the US. The
last miscellaneous group includes everyone else (for details on the industry sector definitions, see
Hall et al., 2005). Subsequently, we estimate (E-9) for each of these industry sectors. Our results
are significant across each of these sectors with economically weakest results being for the Metals
and Machinery and the low-tech sectors. In particular, the estimates on EquityAssets (α1) and
Public
Assets (α2)
for the six sectors are as follows: (i) Drugs: α1 = 1.3 (z=3.49), α2 = 1.9 (z=1.99); (ii) Chemicals:
α1 = 1.9 (z=3.24), α2 = 1.69 (z=4.02); (iii) Computers: α1 = 1.9 (z=6.23), α2 = 1.5 (z=8.41);
(iv) Electrical : α1 = .84 (z=6.19), α2 = .99 (z=3.29); (v) Metals: α1 = .08 (z=1.68), α2 = .45
(z=1.77) and (vi) Others: α1 = .52 (z=4.10), α2 = .20 (z=3.06). These estimates indicate that our
predictions hold across these industry sectors.
Third, we address the concern that a firm’s asymmetric information and agency problem might
be omitted variables in our specification, affecting both the type of financing and innovation.
Though the use of firm fixed effects controls for time invariant unobserved variables (which pos-
sibly include asymmetric information and agency problems within a firm), we also include in our
specification various proxies that have been linked to asymmetric information (market to book,
analyst forecast dispersion and firm specific stock variance) and agency problems (Gompers, Ishi
Metrick governance index, outside block holdings and public pension fund oversight). We find that
our main results are unaffected.41
Fourth, we re-estimate our basic model using aggregate data over three and five year time
intervals, instead of one year periods. The rationale is that our explanatory variables (such as R&D
expenditure) may take longer than one year to fully impact innovation. The results are similar
to our findings in Tables II and III. Fifth, we check the robustness of our results by employing
the alternative dependent variable definitions that we described earlier (CitedPatentTime−Tech,
DrasticTech); mainly to control for any cohort effects within technology class, besides industry,
time and state effects. We find that our regression results are essentially unchanged.42 We also
construct all our measures after excluding self citations (a firm citing its own patents in subsequent
patents that it obtains) and find that it has little effect on our results. Finally, we use the first
difference transformation instead of firm fixed effects transformation for testing our predictions.
This addresses the concern that the fixed effects estimator might be biased due to serial correlation
of firm characteristics. Our results are robust to using first difference transformation.
41Note that we have data on Gompers, Ishi Metrick governance index, outside block holdings and public pension
fund oversight only from 1990 onwards. Thus, our tests with these variables are restricted to the period 1990-2000.
42Additionally, we also try two alternative ranking procedures to measure the overall significance of the firm’s
patents. We rank firms by the total number of citations received by the firm for all its patents in a given year
(DrasticAll) and by the ratio of forward to backward citations for a firm for all its patents in a year (DrasticRatio).
We refer the reader to Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001) where it is discussed in detail why the ratio of forward to
backward citations gives an indication of the significance of a patent.
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VI. Conclusion
In the paper we offer a simple model to show that the financing arrangements of an innovative firm
can matter for the innovation process and the firm’s market value. It is shown that arm’s length
financing, that gives greater discretion to the firm’s manager, may be optimal when the innovation
is drastic and difficult for a financial intermediary to value. On the other hand, when the innovation
is more incremental, it may be optimal to rely on a relationship based financing arrangement that
yields some control to an informed financial intermediary. Hence, the empirical prediction that we
test is that firms that rely predominantly on arm’s length financing, such as equity and public debt,
will innovate more and have more novel innovations than those with relationship based financing,
such as bank debt.
The empirical analysis relies on patents developed by publicly traded US corporations over the
1974-2000 period as a measure of a firm’s innovative activity. Patents are rated as being more
or less drastic based on the citations in subsequent patents. Our empirical findings are consistent
with our hypothesis: there is strong evidence that firms with arm’s length borrowing receive more
patents and these patents tend to be more drastic. The results are economically meaningful – a firm
with a 1 standard deviation above the mean equity to asset ratio (public debt to asset ratio) has
57% (20%) more citation weighted patents. Moreover, access to public debt markets is associated
with 13% more citation weighted patents as compared to firms that do not access the public debt
market.
We extend the empirical analysis of the hypothesis in a variety of ways. A notable finding is
that in the two years following a large infusion of arm’s length financing – specifically, the first time
issue of public debt or a seasoned equity offering – firms tend to have a burst of innovative activity,
suggesting that arm’s length financing may be taking place in anticipation of the innovative activity.
Our results are robust to conditioning on financial constraints faced by the firm, firm size, R&D
expenditure, market to book, firm maturity, the choice of a firm’s decision to go to the public debt
market and a variety of model specifications and variable definitions.
We believe that the results of the paper may have broader implications. The results suggest
that financial development or, at least, the establishment of arm’s length financing institutions,
may affect the innovation process and economic growth. Hence, changes in regulation and taxes
that affect the choice of financing arrangements by firms, may have consequences for technological
advances and, possibly, for longer term economic growth.
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions and Data Sources
1. Ageit: Age of firm i in year t based on the years from a firm’s IPO as reported in CRSP (Source: CRSP).
2. Assetsit: Total assets of firm i in year t (Source: Compustat Data 6).
3. ( Cash
Assets
)it: Cash of firm i in year t divided by its Assets (Source: Compustat Data 1).
4. ( CF
Assets
)it: Cash flow of firm i in year t divided by its Assets (Source: Compustat Data 14+ Data 18).
5. CitedPatentTimeit : Measures the number of citations per patent applied for in year t by firm i. The weight of each patent
is the number of citations received by a patent applied for in year t divided by the total number of citations received by
all patents applied for in year t (Source: NBER Patent Data).
6. CitedPatentTime−Techit : Measures the number of citations per patent applied for in year t by firm i. The weight of each
patent is the number of citations received by a patent applied for in year t divided by the total number of citations
received by all patents applied for in year t, in the same technological class (Source: NBER Patent Data).
7. CitedPatentQuasiit : Measures the number of citations per patent applied for in year t by firm i. The number of citations
of each patent in year t is multiplied by the weighting index and summed for all the patents by firm i in year t and then
divided by the number of patents by firm i in year t (Source: NBER Patent Data).
8. ( Debt
Assets
)it: Total debt of firm i in year t divided by its Assets (Source: Compustat Data 9+ Data 34) .
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9. Drasticit: Count of the drastic patents applied for in year t by firm i. A patent is classified as drastic by first ranking
all the patents in the application year t by the number of times they are cited in all subsequent years in our sample
period. Second, based on this ranking, we select the top 1% patents among all the patents in year t and label them
drastic innovations. Finally, we count the number of drastic patents by firm i in year t (Source: NBER Patent Data).
10. DrasticTechit : Count of the drastic patents in application year t by firm i where the procedure is the same as Drastic
except that the ranking is based on all the patents in the same technological class (Source: NBER Patent Data).
11. DrasticIncremit: An indicator variable which equals 1 if a firm i is in the top 1% of firms ranked by the number of
citations per patent received in year t in a given technology class, and 0 if a firm is ranked among the bottom 30%
(Source: NBER Patent Data).




)it: Book equity of firm i in year t divided by its Assets (Source: Compustat Data 6 - Data 181 + Data 10 +
Data 35 + Data 79). In case Data 10 (preferred stock) is missing the value is replaced by Data 56.
14. Factors: Rmt is the excess value weighted market returns in year t, SMBt is small minus big factor in year t and HMLt
is the high minus low factor in year t (Source: Kenneth French’s web site).
15. HI it: Herfindahl index of firm i in year t constructed based on sales at both a 4 digit SIC and for robustness for the
Fama and French (1997) 48 industries (Source: Compustat; Kenneth French’s web site).
16. KZ it: Measures the financial constraints faced by firm i in year t and is constructed as in (Baker, Wurgler and Stein,
2003). Specifically, KZit = −1.002( CFAssets )it − 39.368( DivAssets )it − 1.315( CashAssets )it + 3.139( DebtAssets )it + 0.283Qit, where
CF
Assets
is cash flow over lagged assets; Div
Assets
is cash dividends over assets; Cash
Assets
is cash balances over assets; Debt
Assets
is the leverage; and Q is the market value of equity over assets constructed as explained in definition 26 (Source:
Compustat).
17. Log(1+%Public)it: Log of one plus the percentage of firms in the industry of firm i in year t that have public debt
outstanding in year t (Source: Compustat; SDC Platinum).
18. Multipleit: A dummy variable takes a value of 1 if firm i borrows from multiple banks in year t or in any year before
that, and 0 if the firm borrows from a single bank (Source: Deal Scan Database).
19. Patentit: Count of the number of patents in application year t by firm i (Source: NBER Patent Data).
20. Patentcit: Number of patents in application year t by firm i corrected for the truncation bias in patents granted towards
the end of the sample using the methodology of Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001, 2005) (Source: NBER Patent Data).
21. Postk2 : A dummy variable that takes a value 1 in year t if 2 years have passed since firm i issued public debt (superscripted
D) for the first time (issued SEO; superscripted E) over the sample period and 0 otherwise where k ∈ {D, E} (Source:
SDC Platinum Database).
22. PPE it: Net property plant and equipment of firm i in year t (Source: Compustat Data 8).
23. Publicit: Amount of public debt outstanding of firm i in year t. Collected from SDC using the information on public
debt issue data and maturity of each debt issue (Source: SDC Platinum Database).
24. Publicsit: A dummy variable that takes value of 1, if firm i has public debt outstanding in current year t or any year
before that, as reported in SDC, and 0 otherwise (Source: SDC Platinum Database).
25. Publiccit: A dummy variable that takes value of 1, if firm i has a bond rating or a commercial paper rating (or both) in
current year t or any year before that, as reported in Compustat, and 0 otherwise (Source: Compustat).
26. Qit: Market to book ratio of firm i in year t
(Source: Compustat Assets +Data 199* Data 25-BookEquity
Assets
; where Data 199 is the year end closing price and Data 25 is
year end outstanding shares).
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27. Rit: Excess stock returns of firm i in year t (Source: CRSP).
28. (RetEarn
Assets
)it: Retained earnings of firm i in year t divided by its Assets (Source: Compustat Data 36 ).
29. RDit: R&D Expenditure by firm i in year t (in $ million) (Source: Compustat Data 46).
30. Salesit: Sales by firm i in year t (in $ million) (Source: Compustat Data 12).
31. S&P 500 it: A dummy variable that takes a value 1 for firm i in year t if the firm is in the S&P 500 Index as reported
in Compustat and 0 otherwise (Source: Compustat).
32. σfirm,it, σind,it, σmkt,it: Campbell et al. (2001) decomposition of stock return volatility of firm i in year t into firm
specific risk, industry specific risk, and market specific risk respectively. More details on the procedure used are provided
in Appendix E. The stock returns are based on CRSP (Source: CRSP).
33. Sizeit: Log of Assets of firm i in year t (Source: Compustat).
34. Tangibleit: Measured as the ratio of PPE to Assets of firm i in year t (Source: Compustat).
Appendix B: Construction of Dependent Variable
The truncation bias in patent grants
The truncation bias in patent grants stems from the fact that there is an average lag of about two years between patent
applications and patent grants. Thus, as one progresses towards the end of the sample, patents reported in the dataset might
under-report the actual patenting propensity of a firm – since many of the patents, though applied for, might not have been
granted. Note that although we use the application year as the relevant year for our analysis, the patents appear in the
database only after they are granted. We follow Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2001; 2005) and correct for this bias by using the
application-grant empirical distribution to compute “weight factors”. Then we multiply each simple patent count (Patent) by
the corresponding weight factor. As we would expect, patents applied for in later years have higher weight factors. In contrast
to Patent which is a count variable, Patentc is a continuous variable.
The truncation bias in patent citations
The truncation bias in patent citations arises because patent citations are received many years after the innovation was
created. We follow Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) and use two methods to correct for the truncation bias. The first method
is called “fixed effects”. It consists of scaling patent citations by dividing them by the average amount of patent citations in the
same group (year, technology class or year-technology class) to which the patent belongs. The advantage of the fixed effects
approach is that we compare only patents that are in the same cohort and effectively purge the data from any effects due to
truncation or other artificial differences in the propensity to receive citations among different groups. The drawback is that
we also remove any real differences among the groups. Since the focus of this paper is not on estimating such differences we
are not very concerned about this drawback. Using the fixed effects method, we create two dependent variables. The first one
measures the number of citations per patent, where the number of citations received by a patent applied for in a given year is
divided by the total number of citations received by all patents applied for in the same year (CitedPatentTime). The second
dependent variable is again citations per patent, where the number of citations received by a patent in a given year in a given
technological class is divided by the total number of citations received by all firms in the same year, in the same technological
class (CitedPatentTime−Tech).
As we mentioned, the fixed effects method has its drawbacks. Therefore, for robustness we use a second method called
“quasi-structural”. It attempts to econometrically estimate the distribution of the citation lag. The benefits of this approach
is that it allows for real differences in the number of citations received in different time periods and technological classes. The
drawback is that it requires two additional assumptions - the shape of the distribution over time is independent of the total
number of citations received and the lag distribution does not change over time. Using the estimated distribution lag, we
create a weighting index and multiply the number of citations by this index. As we would expect, the index is higher for later
years. Our third dependent variable is created by first multiplying the number of citations for each patent by the weighting
index, then calculating the sum of the result for each firm per year and dividing by the number of patents for the same year
(CitedPatentQuasi).
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Appendix C: Control Function Approach and GMM
The basic idea in the control function approach is to use the residuals from the first stage (the choice of financing equation) as
an additional control in the second stage (innovation production equation). In our case, the first stage regression is a logit of
the form:
Financingit = Φ(δzit + β
′xit) + uit, (E-18)
where Financingit is a binary variable representing whether or not the firm borrows from public debt market, xit are control
variables, zit are instruments and uit is the residual. The second stage regression uses OLS specification with CitedPatent as
the dependent variable:
CitedPatentsit = [α0 + αFinancingit + γ
′
wit] + εit. (E-19)
Note that some of the elements of x and w can be the same. The control function assumption (Newey, Powell and Vella, 1999)
can be expressed by the following equation:
E[εit|Financingit,wit, uit] = 0. (E-20)
Under this assumption, controlling for uit in the second stage is sufficient to retrieve the unbiased estimates. In our estimation we
use maximum likelihood to recover the parameters of interest. Specifically, our first stage involves estimating a logit regression
of the form described in (E-15). The second stage then takes the following form:
E[Yit] = [γ1Log(RD)it + γ2Log(Sales)it + αFinancingit + δZit], (E-21)
where Zit is a vector which besides the other explanatory variables used in our main regressions also includes the control
function of residuals constructed from the first stage
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
The second technique that we use in our estimation is GMM since the dependent variable is a count variable (Drastic) and
both the first stage and the second stage are non-linear. In our setting, we consider the following equations:
Drastici = exp{[αFinancingi + γ′x1i] + u1i} (E-22)
Financingi = Φ[α1Drastici + β
′
x2i] + u2i. (E-23)
Note that some of the elements of x1i and x2i can be same. We drop the t subscript in the discussion for notational convenience.
A consistent estimator of (δ1, γ) in this simultaneous equation framework is the GMM estimator, and a natural choice of
instrument for Financingit is Φ(x
′
2iβ̂), where β̂ is the logit estimator of β (Mullahy, 1996; Montalvo, 1997). In our analysis,
we first construct the instrument for the GMM (Φ(x
′
2iβ̂)) by running the first stage (E-15) and then use the approach outlined
below to find the two step efficient GMM estimator.43 We now describe briefly the econometrics behind our two step GMM
estimator. We first present the standard Poisson model for count data. Let yi, i = 1, ...., N denote the dependent count variable,
which is independently Poisson distributed, with conditional mean specified as:
E[yit|xit] = λit = exp(β′xit), (E-24)
where xi is a k vector of explanatory variables and β is a k-vector of parameters. The maximum likelihood estimator, denoted
βML solves the first order condition X
′(y−λ) = 0, where X is an N×K matrix, and y and λ are N vectors, and √N(βML−β)
has a limiting distribution with mean 0 and variance the limit of (N−1X
′
MX)−1, where M=diag(λ). In practice, the standard
errors are often biased due to the presence of over or under dispersion. Correct standard errors are computed from the estimated
variance of the Poisson pseudo likelihood (PL) estimator (See Gouriéroux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984)):



















Note that for the GMM model in our setting, the logical consistency or coherence is an issue. It is easily established that the model is only









x2i]). This expression is equal to 1 if α1=0 or α=0. Assuming that α 6= 0 , i.e. a binary variable
is included as regressor in the model for the count variable, we have that for coherency α = 0. We will assume these conditions hold in our tests.
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The conditional mean specification (E-24) implicitly defines a regression model
yi = λi + ui = exp(β
′xi) + ui
with E[ui|xi] = 0. The GMM estimator (Hansen 1982), based on this moment condition only, minimizes:
(y − λ)′XW−1N X
′
(y − λ) (E-25)
where WN is a weight matrix. As the minimum of the function is obtained at X
′
(y − λ) = 0, the GMM estimator for β will
be the same as the Poisson maximum likelihood estimator, irrespective of the weight matrix (for more details see Mullahy
1996). When some elements of xi are endogenous (as is the case in our paper), implying that E[ui|xi] 6= 0, λi is no longer the
conditional mean of yi and the Poisson ML estimator will no longer be consistent. If there are instruments zi available such
that E(ui|zi) = 0, then the consistent nonlinear instrumental variables (NLIV) estimator is given by the minimization of:
(y − λ)′Z(Z′Z)−1Z′ (y − λ)
This is a one step GMM estimator. However, the efficient two step GMM estimator, given the instruments is found by
minimization of:
(y − λ)′Z( ˜Z′ΩZ)−1Z′ (y − λ)




Proof of Proposition 1: The proof of when the bank will be given control follows from conditions described in the text. For
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µ(1−β(n)) is decreasing in β(n). Thus, for the maximum possible value of β(n) in this


















(1−φ(n)µ) is decreasing in φ(n). Thus, for the




(1−φ̂µ) and β(n) ≥ β∗.
To prove that for novel projects, bank is less likely to get control, it is enough to show that the partial derivative of left hand
side of (E-3) w.r.t. n is decreasing in n. The derivative is: φ′(n)µ(1− β(n)) + β′(n)(1− µφ(n)) < 0. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2: For proof of part (a), recall that the bank loans have to be of short maturity and the loans have
to be structured so that it is optimal for the bank to terminate the project when it receives a negative signal. Denote by L1
and L2 the 1-period loans that are made by the bank, where L1 is the loan at t = 0 to be repaid at date t = 1 and L2 is the
refinancing loan at t = 1 and is to be paid at t = 2. L1 is chosen before the bank receives its signal at t = 1; however since L2
is determined at t = 1 it can be affected by whether the bank’s signal is positive or negative. Let us denote by L+2 & L
−
2 the
second period loans from the bank depending on whether it receives a positive or negative signal. We set L2 to be the largest
financing that would be feasible without bankruptcy risk at date 1 to ensure that debt will be risk-free. First let us consider
when the signal s is negative. Under this scenario, the project is to be terminated and we require that:
L−2 < L1 ≤ β(n)v̄ + L−2
L−2 = Y2 (E-26)
The intuition behind these conditions is as follows. First, if there is to be liquidation on receiving a negative signal, then
L1 > L
−
2 ensures that the first period loan L1 is large enough not to be paid by refinancing loan L
−
2 when the bank receives
a negative signal. Second, with L1 ≤ βv̄ + L−2 , the maximum second period loan after a negative signal plus liquidation of
the project (β(n)v̄ + L−2 ) is sufficient to pay off L1. These two conditions ensure that the bank terminates the project when it
receives a negative signal. Finally, we set L−2 to Y2 since this keeps the debt risk-free. Besides the reputational costs imposed
on the B if the firm defaults, it is also never in the interest of M to let the firm default since she loses the associated private
benefits. Note that since the board is interested in setting the debt to the maximal amount without imposing bankruptcy risk,
they would set L1 = β(n)v̄ + Y2. Ex-ante value of the innovative project with the bank control is µv̄φ(n). Since the manager
diverts θ of this value, ex-ante equity value is the remainder: (1− θ)µv̄φ(n).
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Note that if s is positive, the bank will be able to provide a second period loan (L+2 ) that is sufficient to pay off the first
period loan. Since the project is successful, the board would force any additional cash-flow out of the firm in the form of a
dividend. Therefore we require:
L+2 ≥ L1 = β(n)v̄ + Y2
L+2 = Y2 + min{v} = Y2 + vl (E-27)
The intuition behind these conditions is as follows. First, with a positive signal the maximum second period loan L+2 should
be large enough to allow L1 to be refinanced without liquidation of the project. The second condition sets the debt L
+
2 to the
maximum amount of cash flow that is expected at t=1 after a positive signal (Y2 + vl). Note that if vl > β(n)v̄, with bank
debt, there may be extra free cash with the firm at t = 1. B forces M to distribute any such excess cash as dividends.
For part (b), note that the public debt is set equal to the maximal amount of cash expected (for certain) at t = 0 (Y2) and the
rest of the capital structure is again equity (1− θ)µv̄. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3: The Equity
Debt
ratio with bank control is given by
(1−θ)µv̄
β(n)v̄+Y2




chooses to borrow from the public debt market. Comparing the two terms, the proportion of equity to debt is higher when the
firm borrows from the public debt markets. Since the control shifts from the bank to public debt as the project becomes novel
(Proposition 1) and with greater number of anticipated innovations (Corollary 1), the conclusion follows. ¥
Appendix E: Campbell Variance Decomposition
We compute the variance of the past 36 months of stock returns of the firm preceding the year t, and use it as a proxy
for the overall risk. CRSP data provides the value-weighted return, the variance of which we use as the market specific risk.
To compute the industry specific return, we form a market-value weighted portfolio of all the firms in that industry (based on
Fama French 48 industries). To get the industry and firm specific risk, we regress the value weighted industry return on the
market return and get the residual. The variance of this residual is treated as the industry-specific risk. Similarly, we regress
firm return on industry residual return and market return and get the residual, the variance of which is treated as firm-specific




This table reports the summary statistics of the key variables used in our analysis. Patent information comes from the NBER
patent data set provided by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001). This information includes the number of patents by each firm
and the number of citations received by each patent. We select all public firms from the NBER patent file, which have financial
data available in the S&P’s Compustat database. We include all the firms in Compustat which operate in the same industries
as the firms in the patent database, but don’t have patents. Data on Sales, R&D expenditures, the Herfindahl index, leverage
and net property plant and equipment comes from Compustat. We exclude financial firms (SIC codes starting with 6) and
government firms (SIC codes starting with 9). We collect data on public debt issues from SDC Platinum. Panel A corresponds
to firm years for firms with above and below median Patent in the sample. Among the firms that patent, Panel B corresponds
to firm years for firms with above and below median citation weighted patents (CitedPatentTime) in the sample period. All
differences between Column (1) and Column (4) in Panels A and B are statistically significant at 1% level. Panel C presents
the correlation between key variables used in our analysis. Data in this table is for the period 1974 to 2000.
Panel A: Firm Characteristics and Patents
Patent≤ Median (=0) Patent> Median(=0) All Firms
Mean Max Min Mean Max Min Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sales ($ million) 931 15,610 0.11 2,799 40,993 4.03 1,118
RD ($ million) 38 820 .01 111 1998 .12 53
Tangible .32 .92 .01 .33 .87 .04 .32
Equity
Assets
.49 .88 .05 .54 .91 .05 .50
Public
Assets
.02 .43 .00 .05 .47 .00 .03
Publics .12 1 0 .35 1 0 .13
HI .43 .94 .13 .49 .95 .22 .44
Q 1.60 10.1 .43 1.86 8.82 .56 1.80
Observations 92,520 16,980 109,500
Panel B: Firm Characteristics and Citation Weighted Patents for Patenting Firms
CitedPatentTime≤ Median (=7) CitedPatentTime> Median (=7) All Firms
Mean Max Min Mean Max Min Mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sales ($ million) 2,594 38,236 4.03 2,994 40,993 2.53 2,799
RD ($ million) 107 2,018 .12 121 2,098 .62 111
Tangible .32 .78 .04 .33 .87 .05 .32
Equity
Assets
.51 .89 .05 .58 .93 .06 .54
Public
Assets
.05 .42 .00 .07 .47 .00 .05
Publics .33 1 0 .37 1 0 .35
HI .49 .94 .22 .50 .94 .22 .49
Q 1.49 6.6 .56 1.95 10.1 .59 1.86
Observations 7,524 9,456 16,980
Panel C: Correlation Matrix of Main Explanatory Variables






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log(Sales) 1.00
Log(RD) .29 1.00
Tangible .13 .03 1.00
Equity
Assets
-.01 -.04 -.07 1.00
Public
Assets
.06 .05 .05 -.04 1.00
HI -.05 -.03 .02 -.03 .02 1.00
Q -.03 -.001 -.10 -.05 -.03 -.06 1.00
EBIDTA
Assets
.03 .02 .05 .32 .02 .03 -.20 1.00
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Table II:
Patents and Financing Arrangements
This table reports the results relating patents produced in a firm to the type of its financing. Specifically we estimate poisson
models in Columns (1) to (6), a negative binomial model in Column (7) and OLS in Column (8). All variable definitions are
provided in Appendix A. The dependent variable is Patent in Column (1) to (7) and Patentc in Column (8). Other controls
(not reported in the table) include Age2. All regressions are estimated with time, state and industry fixed effects and the
standard errors reported in the parenthesis are heteroskedastic consistent to account for over dispersion in poisson models and




Patent Patent Patent Patent Patent Patent Patent Patentc
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson NegBin OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log(Sales) .597 .561 .540 .418 .563 .770 .277 .10
(.002)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
Log(RD) .394 .407 .406 .408 .409 .140 .061 .15
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
Hi 2.197 3.024 2.912 1.634 2.867 .766 .766 1.2
(.093)∗∗∗ (.093)∗∗∗ (.093)∗∗∗ (.094)∗∗∗ (.093)∗∗∗ (.100)∗∗∗ (.310)∗∗ (.14)∗∗∗
Hi2 -2.553 -3.406 -3.331 -2.410 -3.254 -1.881 -.859 -.22
(.072)∗∗∗ (.072)∗∗∗ (.072)∗∗∗ (.073)∗∗∗ (.072)∗∗∗ (.078)∗∗∗ (.264)∗∗∗ (.12)∗
Equity
Assets
.184 .227 .211 .243 .298 .105 .092 .11
(.014)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗ (.026)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗
Publicc .192
(.005)∗∗∗
Publics .199 .075 .069 .073 .066
(.004)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗
Public
Assets
.320 .733 .344 .14
(.002)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗∗ (.040)∗∗∗ (.01)∗∗∗
Q .067 .063 .051 .070 .044 .034 .05
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.02)∗∗
Tangible 1.060 .994 .990 1.071 .374 .253 .11
(.017)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.024)∗∗∗ (.073)∗∗∗ (.01)∗∗∗
EBIDTA
Assets
.823 .786 .768 .754 1.291 .848 .512
(.026)∗∗∗ (.026)∗∗∗ (.026)∗∗∗ (.026)∗∗∗ (.033)∗∗∗ (.080)∗∗∗ (.02)∗∗∗
Age .049 .051 .050 .045 .047 .044 .048
(.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗
Cash
Assets
-.21 -.20 -.19 -.29 -.30 -.28 -.22
(.26) (.29) (.31) (.36) (.33) (.80) (.29)
RetEarn
Assets
-.03 -.02 -.03 -.03 -.03 -.02 -.02
(.01)∗ (.03) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.03)
Observations 109,003 109,003 109,003 109,003 109,003 57,330 57,330 109,003
Adjusted R2 0.22
Log-likelihood -33,644.7 -33,841.0 -33,843.4 -33,851.6 -33,855.1 -19,840.3 -19,680.8
p-value, χ2 test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
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Table III:
Citation Weighted Patents and Financing Arrangements
This table reports the results relating cited patents produced in a firm to the type of its financing. Specifically we estimate
panel OLS models in all the columns. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. The dependent variable is citation
weighted patents, CitedPatentTime. Other controls (not reported in the table) include Age2. All regressions are estimated with
time, state and industry fixed effects and the standard errors reported in the parenthesis are corrected for the panel. Data is
for the period 1974 to 2000. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Dependent Variable: CitedPatentTime
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log(Sales) .216 .203 .159 .212 .209
(.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.021)∗∗∗
Log(RD) .367 .367 .353 .366 .162
(.009)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗
Hi 2.389 2.373 2.300 2.380 .94
(.662)∗∗∗ (.663)∗∗∗ (.661)∗∗∗ (.661)∗∗∗ (.476)∗∗
Hi2 -1.549 -1.546 -1.510 -1.546 -.276
(.562)∗∗∗ (.564)∗∗∗ (.562)∗∗∗ (.562)∗∗∗ (.145)∗∗
Equity
Assets
.801 .555 .714 .843 .342
(.073)∗∗∗ (.095)∗∗∗ (.095)∗∗∗ (.074)∗∗∗ (.114)∗∗∗
Publicc .081
(.022)∗∗∗






Q .005 .007 .006 .005 .015
(.002)∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗ (.002)∗∗ (.007)∗∗
Tangible .740 .713 .714 .747 .385
(.085)∗∗∗ (.086)∗∗∗ (.086)∗∗∗ (.085)∗∗∗ (.159)∗∗
EBIDTA
Assets
.004 .014 .003 .003 .100
(.003)∗ (.005)∗∗ (.001)∗∗ (.002)∗∗ (.045)∗∗
Age .041 .043 .049 .043 .049
(.003)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.002)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗
Cash
Assets
-.14 -.13 -.13 -.21 -.19
(.11) (.12) (.11) (.1) (.15)
RetEarn
Assets
-.07 -.08 -.07 -.07 -.09
(.06) (.07) (.09) (.07) (.08)
Observations 109,003 109,003 109,003 109,003 97,990
Adjusted R2 .16 .17 .17 .19 .22
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes
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Table IV:
Alternative Measures of Novel Patents and Financing Arrangements
This table reports the results relating novel patents produced in a firm to the type of its financing. Specifically we estimate
Poisson models in Columns (1) to (4), a negative binomial model in Column (5) and OLS in Column (6). Other controls




, Age and Age2. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.
The dependent variable is Drastic in Column (1) to (5) and CitedPatentQuasi in Column (6). All regressions are estimated
with time, state and industry fixed effects and the standard errors reported in the parenthesis are heteroskedastic consistent to
account for over dispersion in poisson models and are corrected for the panel in all the models. Data is for the period 1974 to
2000. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Dependent Variable
Model Specification
Drastic Drastic Drastic Drastic Drastic CitedPatentQuasi
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson NegBin OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(Sales) .179 .228 .111 .270 .147 .209
(.029)∗∗∗ (.029)∗∗∗ (.029)∗∗∗ (.055)∗∗∗ (.050)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗
Log(RD) .619 .656 .648 .301 .265 .365
(.026)∗∗∗ (.027)∗∗∗ (.027)∗∗∗ (.047)∗∗∗ (.045)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗
Hi 1.171 1.377 .214 -1.553 .074 2.374
(.855) (.860) (.863) (.934)∗ (1.312) (.661)∗∗∗
Hi2 -2.804 -2.999 -1.925 -.692 -.511 -1.550
(.639)∗∗∗ (.642)∗∗∗ (.647)∗∗∗ (.700) (1.049) (.562)∗∗∗
Equity
Assets
.832 .834 .890 .647 .660 .802
(.159)∗∗∗ (.157)∗∗∗ (.158)∗∗∗ (.198)∗∗∗ (.261)∗∗ (.073)∗∗∗
Publicc .153
(.012)∗∗∗
Publics .136 .137 .138 .133 .121
(.013)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗
Public
Assets
.748 .504 .896 .549
(.066)∗∗∗ (.234)∗∗ (.344)∗∗∗ (.079)∗∗∗
Q .009 .007 .005 .005 .001 .007
(.014) (.007) (.014) (.019) (.024) (.003)∗∗∗
Tangible 2.076 2.277 2.148 .515 .197 .712
(.163)∗∗∗ (.161)∗∗∗ (.162)∗∗∗ (.213)∗∗ (.280) (.080)∗∗∗
EBIDTA
Assets
.319 .355 .408 1.331 1.375 .014
(.186)∗ (.194)∗∗ (.249)∗∗∗ (.347)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗∗ (.021)
Observations 109,003 109,003 109,003 49,040 49,040 109,003
Adjusted R2 .20
Log-likelihood -28,754.4 -29,168.4 -29,172.2 -19,120.1 -20,198.3
p-value, χ2 test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes
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Table V:
Drastic vs. Incremental Patents and Financing Arrangements
This table reports the results of regressions relating innovations to the type of financing for a sub-sample of firms as defined
below. In Columns (1) and (2), we estimate the panel regression of CitedPatentTime on various explanatory variables for
firms which have at least one patent in a given year during our sample. In Columns (3) and (4) we estimate the panel logit
regression of the modified innovation variable (DrasticIncrem) on various explanatory variables. DrasticIncrem is a dummy
variable which equals 1 if a firm is in the top 1% in terms of the citations received for a given year in a given industry, and





, Age and Age2. All regressions are estimated with time, state and industry fixed effects and
the standard errors reported in the parenthesis are corrected for the panel. Data is for the period 1974 to 2000. ***, ** and *
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
CitedPatentTimeP>0 DrasticIncrem=1
OLS OLS Logit Logit
Log(Sales) .643 .652 .214 .281
(.077)∗∗∗ (.077)∗∗∗ (.032)∗∗∗ (.029)∗∗∗
Log(RD) .310 .308 .366 .380
(.053)∗∗∗ (.053)∗∗∗ (.024)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗
Hi 6.786 6.609 4.331 4.322
(3.490)∗∗ (3.491)∗∗∗ (1.636)∗∗∗ (1.682)∗∗
Hi2 -3.217 -3.076 -4.088 -3.929
(3.771) (3.772) (1.392)∗∗∗ (1.088)∗∗
Equity
Assets
.971 .962 .363 .395







Q .443 .445 .099 .086
(.061)∗∗∗ (.061)∗∗∗ (.023)∗∗∗ (.019)∗∗∗
Tangible .427 .455 .878 .895
(.755) (.755) (.277)∗∗∗ (.312)∗∗∗
EBIDTA
Assets
.343 .374 .555 .595
(.774) (.774) (.283)∗ (.287)∗
Observations 15,085 15,085 10,200 10,200
Adjusted R2 .14 .15
Log-likelihood -4,529.4 -4,547.3
p-value, χ2 test 0.00 0.00
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
53
Table VI:
Innovation and Financial Constraints : KZ Quintiles
This table reports the results relating cited patents produced in a firm to the type of its financing. The coefficient estimates
reported in the table are obtained using a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we sort all the firms year wise into quintiles
according to their KZ index. In the second stage, for each quintile, we estimate a panel regression of CitedPatentTime or
Patent on various explanatory variables. Panel A presents coefficient estimates with Patent as the dependent variable while
Panel B presents estimates with CitedPatentTime as the dependent variable. Other controls (not reported in the table) include
Publics, Log(Sales), Log(RD), Q, Tangible, Age, Age2, HI and HI 2. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. All
regressions are estimated with time, state and industry fixed effects and the standard errors reported in the parenthesis are
corrected for the panel in all the models. Data is for the period 1974 to 2000. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and
10% respectively.
Panel A: Financial Constraints, Patents and Type of Financing





.017 .018 .032 .024 .015
(.004)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.003)∗∗∗
Public
Assets
.474 .271 .491 .108 .014
(.117)∗∗∗ (.054)∗∗∗ (.071)∗∗∗ (.044)∗∗ (.008)∗
RetEarn
Assets
-.026 -.042 -.017 -.015 .00008
(.007)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.009)∗ (.009) (.0007)
Cash
Assets
-.086 -.188 -.229 -.363 .170
(.073) (.073)∗∗ (.069)∗∗∗ (.085)∗∗∗ (.045)∗∗∗
EBIDTA
Assets
.01 .07 .03 .04 .008
(.055) (.061) (.051) (.063) (.011)
Mean Quintile KZ -.73 .45 1.00 1.64 3.08
Observations 22,716 23,112 23,125 23,139 23,076
Adjusted R2 .13 .11 .16 .17 .15
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Financial Constraints, Citation Weighted Patents and Type of Financing





.244 .676 .203 .479 .141
(.120)∗∗ (.194)∗∗∗ (.126) (.155)∗∗∗ (.040)∗∗∗
Public
Assets
.850 .556 1.351 .445 .329
(.319)∗∗∗ (.180)∗∗∗ (.283)∗∗∗ (.142)∗∗∗ (.116)∗∗∗
RetEarn
Assets
-.033 -.075 -.008 -.031 -.003
(.019)∗ (.034)∗∗ (.035) (.029) (.003)
Cash
Assets
-1.221 -.275 -.212 -.295 .151
(.199)∗∗∗ (.242) (.273) (.276) (.042)∗∗∗
EBIDTA
Assets
.091 .19 .073 .23 .02
(.14) (.22) (.21) (.20) (.043)
Mean Quintile KZ -.73 .45 1.00 1.64 3.08
Observations 22,716 23,112 23,125 23,139 23,076
Adjusted R2 .12 .18 .16 .17 .18
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table VII:
Citation Weighted Patents and Financing Arrangements: Quintile Analysis
This table reports the results relating cited patents produced in a firm to the type of its financing. The coefficient estimates
reported in the table are obtained using a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we sort all the firms year wise into quintiles
according to a firm characteristic. In the second stage, for each characteristic quintile, we estimate a panel regression of
CitedPatentTime on various explanatory variables. Panel A, B, C, D and E present coefficient estimates with firms sorted into




respectively. Other controls (not reported in the table) include Publics,






, HI and HI 2. All variable definitions are provided
in Appendix A. All regressions are estimated with time, state and industry fixed effects and the standard errors reported in the
parenthesis are corrected for the panel in all the models. Data is for the period 1974 to 2000 ***, ** and * denote significance
at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Low High
Panel A: Sales Quintiles
Equity
Assets
.232 .264 .165 .735 .171
(.019)∗∗∗ (.079)∗∗∗ (.066)∗∗ (.153)∗∗∗ (.201)∗∗∗
Public
Assets
.103 .115 .186 .158 .278
(.015)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.208)∗∗∗ (.221)∗∗∗
Mean Quintile Value ($ mill) 4.2 25.11 87.95 336.45 1,848.87
Observations 30,606 28,796 29,165 28,222 28,305
Panel B: Q Quintiles
Equity
Assets
.194 .909 1.086 1.206 .90
(.115)∗ (.136)∗∗∗ (.139)∗∗∗ (.116)∗∗∗ (.065)∗∗∗
Public
Assets
.551 .787 .310 .390 .329
(.128)∗∗∗ (.166)∗∗∗ (.021)∗∗∗ (.162)∗∗ (.201)∗
Mean Quintile Value .72 .96 1.19 1.63 4.67
Observations 23,144 23,188 23,170 23,188 23,179
Panel C: Age Quintiles
Equity
Assets
.245 .263 .212 .388 .195
(.057)∗∗∗ (.052)∗∗∗ (.029)∗∗∗ (.088)∗∗∗ (.072)∗∗∗
Public
Assets
.205 .276 .458 .421 .455
(.018)∗∗∗ (.118)∗∗ (.173)∗∗∗ (.154)∗∗∗ (.205)∗∗
Mean Quintile Value (yrs from IPO) 1.99 5.50 10.93 14.72 31.94






.126 .373 .233 .431 .126
(.040)∗∗∗ (.070)∗∗∗ (.053)∗∗∗ (.039)∗∗∗ (.057)∗∗
Public
Assets
.698 .340 .792 .112 .269
(.158)∗∗∗ (.136)∗∗ (.165)∗∗∗ (.021)∗∗∗ (.142)∗
Mean Quintile Value .005 .02 .05 .12 .37






.170 .107 .809 .663 .244
(.028)∗∗∗ (.053)∗∗ (.102)∗∗∗ (.097)∗∗∗ (.061)∗∗∗
Public
Assets
.101 .690 .750 .504 .893
(.035)∗∗∗ (.224)∗∗∗ (.148)∗∗∗ (.195)∗∗∗ (.283)∗∗∗
Mean Quintile Value .001 .05 .10 .15 .26
Observations 28,930 23,105 30,507 30,909 30,803
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table VIII:
Citation Weighted Patents after Seasoned Equity Offering and First Time
Public Debt Issue
This table reports the results relating novel patents produced in a firm to the type of its financing subsequent to a public
debt offering and a seasoned equity offering. We estimate an OLS model in all the columns with the dependent variable







and HI 2. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. All regressions are estimated with time, state and industry fixed
effects and the standard errors reported in the parenthesis are corrected for the panel in all the models. Data is for the period
1974 to 2000. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Dependent Variable: CitedPatentTime
Post First Time Public Debt Issue Post Seasoned Equity Offering
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(Sales) .135 .135 .135 .134 .132 .130
(.006)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗
Log(RD) .349 .349 .349 .349 .349 .349
(.007)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗
Hi 1.800 1.793 1.792 1.785 1.781 1.777
(.491)∗∗∗ (.491)∗∗∗ (.491)∗∗∗ (.491)∗∗∗ (.490)∗∗∗ (.490)∗∗∗
Hi2 -1.011 -1.007 -1.006 -.982 -.975 -.969
(.421)∗∗ (.421)∗∗ (.421)∗∗ (.421)∗∗ (.421)∗∗ (.421)∗∗
Equity
Assets
.793 .791 .790 .777 .770 .766
(.053)∗∗∗ (.053)∗∗∗ (.053)∗∗∗ (.053)∗∗∗ (.053)∗∗∗ (.053)∗∗∗
Public
Assets
.448 .511 .508 .704 .796 .749
(.061)∗∗∗ (.060)∗∗∗ (.063)∗∗∗ (.071)∗∗∗ (.077)∗∗∗ (.079)∗∗∗












Public#s .060 .063 .064
(.024)∗∗∗ (.025)∗∗∗ (.025)∗∗∗
Publics .073 .072 .071
(.032)∗∗ (.032)∗∗ (.032)∗∗
Observations 109,003 109,003 109,003 109,003 109,003 109,003
Adjusted R2 .17 .17 .17 .18 .18 .18
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table IX:
Determinants of Choice of Public Debt Financing (First Stage)
This table reports the results of regressions relating the choice of public debt financing to key explanatory variables used in the
prior literature. Specifically, we estimate the panel logit regression where the dependent variable is a dummy variable Publics.
Other controls (not reported in the table) include σmkt and
Cash
Assets
. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. All
regressions are estimated with time and industry fixed effects and the standard errors reported in the parenthesis are corrected
for the panel in all the models. Data is for the period 1974 to 2000. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively.
Dependent Variable: Publics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
σind -8.689 -10.400
(1.243)∗∗∗ (2.431)∗∗∗




Size .701 .626 .689 .611
(.013)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗
Tangible .601 .583 .375 .316
(.078)∗∗∗ (.079)∗∗∗ (.084)∗∗∗ (.085)∗∗∗
Q -.035 -.127 -.023 -.112
(.015)∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗ (.014) (.019)∗∗∗
EBIDTA
Assets
-.790 -.903 -.706 -.809
(.109)∗∗∗ (.116)∗∗∗ (.111)∗∗∗ (.117)∗∗∗
Equity
Assets
-2.625 -2.571 -2.523 -2.450
(.134)∗∗∗ (.135)∗∗∗ (.134)∗∗∗ (.135)∗∗∗
Age .021 .021 .021 .021
(.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
σfirm -3.590 -3.952 -3.262 -3.545
(1.529)∗∗ (1.558)∗∗ (1.441)∗∗ (1.460)∗∗
Observations 109,003 109,003 109,003 109,003
Log-likelihood -36,300.8 -36,317.4 -36,359.6 -36,599.9
p-value, χ2 test 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table X:
Citation Weighted Patents and Financing Arrangements: Instrumental
Variables (Second Stage) – Control Function Approach and GMM
This table reports the results of regressions relating innovations produced in a firm to its type of financing while addressing the
choice of firms to take on public debt. In Columns (1), (2) and (3) we follow the control function (CFA) approach (Newey, Powell
and Vella, 1999) and include control function constructed from the determinants of financing equation (Table X). Specifically,
we estimate the panel regression of CitedPatentTime on various explanatory variables including the control function of residuals.
In Columns (4), (5) and (6), we estimate the GMM estimator (Mullahy, 1996) with Publics being instrumented by the predicted
value (Φ(Z′β)) constructed based on Table IX and the dependent variable being Drastic. A more detailed description of the
control function approach and GMM is provided in the text and in Appendix B. Other controls (not reported in the table)






, Age and Age2. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix A.
All regressions are estimated with time, state and industry fixed effects and the standard errors reported in the parenthesis are
corrected for the panel in all the models. Data is for the period 1974 to 2000. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and
10% respectively.
Dependent Variable: CitedPatentTime Dependent Variable: Drastic
CFA CFA CFA GMM GMM GMM
σind S&P 500 Log(1+%Public) σind S&P 500 Log(1+%Public)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(Sales) .159 .158 .263 .121 .119 .115
(.008)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.004)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗ (.005)∗∗∗
Log(RD) .303 .301 .303 .554 .552 .553
(.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗
Equity
Assets
.642 .655 .641 .814 .811 .812
(.095)∗∗∗ (.093)∗∗∗ (.093)∗∗∗ (.159)∗∗∗ (.155)∗∗∗ (.152)∗∗∗
Publics .082 .071 .077 .112 .118 .116
(.022)∗∗∗ (.020)∗∗∗ (.021)∗∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗
Public
Assets
.437 .443 .441 .409 .402 .401
(.077)∗∗∗ (.079)∗∗∗ (.078)∗∗∗ (.201)∗∗∗ (.202)∗∗∗ (.209)∗∗∗
Observations 109,003 109,003 109,003 109,003 109,003 109,003
Adjusted R2 .17 .18 .18
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hausman endogeneity test based on estimates in Table III and GMM in Table IX




Innovation and Multiple Bank Relationships
This table reports the results relating innovations produced in a firm to its type of banking relationship for firms who do
not have access to public debt markets in our sample. Specifically we estimate OLS in Columns (1) to (4), poisson model in
Column (5) and negative binomial model in Column (6). The dependent variable is Patentc in Column (1), CitedPatentTime





Age and Age2. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. All regressions are estimated with time, state and industry
fixed effects and the standard errors reported in the parenthesis are heteroskedastic consistent to account for over dispersion
in poisson models and are corrected for the panel in all the models. Data is for the period 1985 to 2000. ***, ** and * denote
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Dependent Variable
Model Specification
Patentc CitedPatentTime CitedPatentTime CitedPatentTime Drastic Drastic
OLS OLS OLS OLS Poisson NegBin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(Sales) .338 .282 .281 .225 .559 .294
(.029)∗∗∗ (.047)∗∗∗ (.047)∗∗∗ (.172) (.058)∗∗∗ (.105)∗∗∗
Log(RD) .388 .346 .346 .389 .407 .488
(.021)∗∗∗ (.034)∗∗∗ (.035)∗∗∗ (.098)∗∗∗ (.042)∗∗∗ (.080)∗∗∗
HI 1.710 -5.185 -5.183 -.506 4.983 6.290
(2.543) (4.097) (4.104) (5.302) (3.595) (3.475)∗
HI2 -1.024 4.945 4.939 .351 -4.297 -3.790
(2.161) (3.482) (3.488) (4.441) (2.778) (3.268)
Equity
Assets
.102 .738 .685 .784 .358 .855
(.051)∗∗ (.343)∗∗ (.331)∗∗ (.324)∗∗ (.196)∗∗ (.442)∗∗
Multiple .308 .383 .384 .314 .812 .620
(.093)∗∗∗ (.150)∗∗ (.150)∗∗ (.20)∗ (.178)∗∗∗ (.261)∗∗
KZ -.011
(.056)
Q .046 .098 .096 .276 .259 .226
(.022)∗∗ (.036)∗∗∗ (.037)∗∗∗ (.096)∗∗∗ (.051)∗∗∗ (.085)∗∗∗
Tangible .991 .189 .187 .644 4.409 1.872
(.258)∗∗∗ (.416) (.417) (1.013) (.416)∗∗∗ (.737)∗∗
EBIDTA
Assets
.790 .262 .247 1.664 .225 .777
(.244)∗∗∗ (.394) (.403) (.918)∗ (.564) (1.133)
Observations 6,493 6,493 6,480 5,671 2,185 2,185
Adjusted R2 .15 .12 .12 .12
Log-likelihood -2,465.7 -2,168.8
p-value, χ2 test 0.00 0.00
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
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Table XII:
Citation Weighted Patents and Future Firm Value and Abnormal Returns
This table reports the results relating cited patents produced in a firm to the type of its financing. The coefficient estimate
reported in the table is obtained using a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we sort all the firms who have atleast one
patent over the sample period year wise into quintiles according to their CitedPatentTime. In the second stage, for each quintile,
we estimate a Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression of future market to book on various explanatory variables in Panel A and of





, state, industry and time dummies. In Panel B, control variables include excess value weighted market returns, SMB
and HML factors. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. Data is for the period 1974 to 2000. ***, ** and *
denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Panel A: Value and Cited Patents (per annum)
Qt+1 Qt+2 Qt+3
(1) (2) (3)
Quintile1 (Q1) 1.14 1.22 1.38
(Least Cited) (.67)
∗ (.79) (.91)
Quintile2 (Q2) 1.17 .98 1.32
(.72)∗ (.77) (.92)
Quintile3 (Q3) 1.34 1.18 1.01
(.62)∗∗ (.61)∗ (.77)
Quintile4 (Q4) 1.71 1.68 1.52
(.37)∗∗∗ (.69)∗∗ (.97)
Quintile5 (Q5) 1.80 1.71 1.69
(Most Cited) (.36)
∗∗∗ (.79)∗∗ (1.08)
Difference Q5- Q1 .66 .49 .31
(.22)∗∗∗ (.28)∗ (.37)














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Quintile1 (Q1) .12 .11 .06 -.03 -.03 -.005
(.141) (.142) (.138) (.106) (.108) (.108)
Quintile2 (Q2) .11 .12 .08 -.02 -.02 -.06
(.151) (.120) (.121) (.07) (.07) (.07)
Quintile3 (Q3) .20 .16 .13 .16 .15 .17
(.110)∗ (.991)∗ (.104) (.09)∗ (.09)∗ (.102)
Quintile4 (Q4) .28 .27 .23 .14 .14 .13
(.131)∗∗ (.122)∗∗ (.158) (.081)∗ (.077)∗ (.098)
Quintile5 (Q5) .30 .25 .24 .15 .12 .14
(.150)∗∗ (.148)∗∗ (.182) (.092)∗∗ (.091)∗∗ (.144)
Difference Q5- Q1 .17 .14 .18 .18 .15 .14
(.07)∗∗ (.10)∗ (.13) (.06)∗∗∗ (.110)∗ (.14)
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